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Foreword 
 
 
As part of its Governance program, the Poverty Reduction and Economic Reform Division of 
the World Bank Institute (WBIPR) has sought to strengthen parliamentary oversight, with the 
goal of promoting enhanced government accountability and transparency.  The four papers 
presented here are part of an ongoing series on legislative oversight issues. 
 
In the first paper Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst examine the link between democracy 
and oversight.  They argue that a parliament’s oversight potential, measured by the number of 
oversight tools available to a parliament in a given country, affects the probability that that 
country is formally democratic or liberal democratic. Their argument is supported by 
statistical analysis of a 49-country sample that indicates that the probability that a country is 
formally democratic (and to a lesser extent liberal democratic) increases as the number of 
oversight tools increases.  
 
A second paper, also by Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst, looks more closely at a 
specific oversight tool – the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in national and sub-national 
parliaments throughout the Commonwealth.  Using a survey of 33 PAC Chairs, the paper 
examines how PACs can contibute to effective oversight of government accounts and the 
conditions which promote a PACs good functioning and success.  
 
Chen Friedberg examines parliamentary oversight in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, 
through the lens of two committees, the State Control Committee and the Education and 
Culture Committee, during the 7th, 10th and 13th Knessets.  Her paper centers on the structural 
and procedural problems which characterize the Israeli parliamentary committee system, and 
which may impair the effectiveness of its oversight.   
 
Robert J. Griffiths discusses parliamentary oversight of defense policy in post-apartheid South 
Africa.  Using the case study of the Strategic Defense Procurement Package he provides 
insight into the development of transparency and accountability in defense policy, while 
highlighting the challenges of effective parliamentary oversight such as party discipline, 
executive-legislative relations, and the capacity of parliamentary committees to adequately 
monitor the complexities of government policies. 
   
The views expressed herein are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the World Bank Institute. 
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Democracy and Oversight 
 
Riccardo Pelizzo 
Rick Stapenhurst 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past decade, the field of political science has paid increasing attention to the study of 
legislative oversight, once described as “an important but inadequately researched area of 
legislative activity” (Lees, 1977). Lees’ comment is particularly true with regard to 
comparative analyses of oversight tools and practices. Recent studies have discussed the 
instruments of legislative oversight (Maffio, 2002); while others have investigated how 
legislative oversight relates to both political variables (Pennings, 2000; Damgaard, 2000; 
Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a) and socio-economic conditions (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 
2004b). Despite the renewed interest in oversight, our understanding of legislative oversight, 
as Rockman lamented more than two decades ago (1984), remains asymmetric. The existing 
literature discusses extensively what oversight is; why it is necessary in properly functioning 
democratic regimes; why it is good from a normative point of view; and what conditions favor 
effective oversight. Less attention has been paid to whether legislative oversight has any 
impact on the functioning of a political system and, if so, what kind. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether, and to what extent, oversight affects the 
functioning or the nature of a political regime. Specifically, we test whether, and to what 
extent, the oversight potential, measured on the basis of the number of oversight tools 
available to a parliament in a given country, affects the probability that that country is 
formally democratic or liberal democratic.1
 
The first section of the paper will discuss current legislative oversight literature and how this 
literature has investigated the determinants, the mechanisms, the tools and the possible 
consequences of legislative oversight of government activities.  We argue that since 
democracy does not depend exclusively on a government’s ability to perform, but also on 
government’s actions being subject to scrutiny and control, the probability that a country is 
democratic should be affected by the legislature’s potential to oversee the government.2  
 
1 The difference between oversight potential and effective oversight is, as we will discuss in the course of the 
paper, of great importance. We speak of effective oversight, when legislatures actually oversee governments’ 
actions and activities and when this oversight function has an impact on the political system and, more 
specifically, on the government behavior. We speak of oversight potential to denote the set of formal powers and 
instruments that legislatures have to oversee government activities regardless of whether these powers and 
instruments are actually used. 
2 This view is obviously very different from Huntington’s (1991) argued several years ago. For Huntington 
(1991: 9-10) “elections, open, free and fair are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. 
Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by 
special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities may make 
such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic”. Huntington’s position is questionable 
for at least two reasons. First of all, if instead of conceiving democracy as a dichotomous variable (a regime is 
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In the second part of the paper, we present the results of our statistical analyses. Our findings 
are consistent with our hypothesis: the results of logistic regressions reveal that the probability 
that a country is formally democratic increases as the number of oversight tools increases. 
Similarly the probability that a country is liberal democratic is also sensitive to the number of 
oversight tools available to the parliament, although not to the same degree as the probability 
that it is formally democratic.3  
 
The third and final section of the paper discusses the implications of these findings. We 
suggest that the results of our analyses are relevant for two reasons:  
 
1. The results show that oversight potential has a profound effect on the nature and the 
functioning of a political system. The probability that a country is formally democratic 
(and to a lesser extent the probability that a country is liberal democratic) is affected 
by the oversight potential.  
2. The results show that international organizations are correct in arguing that 
strengthening legislatures is beneficial to promoting democracy and good governance. 
However, our work shows that while oversight potential promotes (formal) 
democracy, the promotion of liberal democracy requires that real and effective 
oversight is implemented. International organizations therefore have to find ways to 
promote effective oversight and not just oversight potential. 
 
Oversight in the Literature 
 
The study of legislative oversight focuses on four basic questions:  
 
1. What is oversight?  
2. Why is oversight good for a political system?  
3. How can oversight be exercised?  
4. What is the impact of oversight? 
 
democratic or non democratic) we conceive it instead as a continuous variable (a regime can be more or less 
democratic), the fact that a government is corrupt, irresponsible, unable, or unwilling to address citizens’ 
demands makes the political system less democratic than those systems in which governments are responsive, 
accountable and responsible. Second, it could also be argued that beyond a certain point, irresponsiveness, 
irresponsibility, and non-accountability make governments non–democratic. Huntington’s faith in elections as a 
sine qua non must be considered with some skepticism. With the emergence of illiberal democracies we now 
know that elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a political regime to be democratic. See 
Diamond (1999) and, more recently Carothers (2002).   
3 Formal democracies are political regimes characterized by vertical accountability through regular, free and fair 
elections and by the lack of horizontal accountability. By contrast, liberal democracies are characterized by the 
fact that they are both vertically and horizontally accountable, that is by the fact that the power of the executive 
branch is constrained, checked and balanced by other branches of government, and also by the fact that civil 
rights and political rights of individuals and groups are protected. While democracy and freedom are not exactly 
the same thing (Morlino, 1975; Katz, 1997), The Gastil index of Freedom still provides a useful and usable 
measure of democracy or liberal democracy precisely because it estimates a country’s level of 
freedom/democracy by assessing the extent to which civil and political rights are respected. 
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With regard to the first question, scholars have proposed several different definitions of 
oversight. Some scholars have suggested that legislative oversight consists of legislative 
supervision of the policies and programs enacted by the government (Schick, 1976). Other 
scholars have suggested instead that oversight goes beyond supervision of the executive 
branch’s activities to include supervision of the executive’s legislative proposals (Maffio, 
2002). In parliamentary systems, where the executive branch of government has the power to 
introduce a bill, the process through which a bill becomes a law (the referral of the bill to 
specific committees; the discussion of the bill within such committees; the debates on a bill in 
the plenary; and the fact that the parliament ultimately has the power to amend, approve or 
reject a government’s legislative proposal) gives the legislative branch the power oversee a 
government’s plans before they are enacted. 
 
Regardless of whether oversight is viewed as a sort of ex post review of government policies 
and programs or whether it is viewed instead as supervision of government activities that can 
be performed both ex post and ex ante, scholars generally agree that effective oversight is 
good for the proper functioning of a democratic political system. Effective oversight is 
beneficial for a political system for at least, two reasons (West and Cooper, 1989): first, 
because oversight activity can contribute to improving the quality of policies or programs 
initiated by the government; second, as government policies are ratified by the legislative 
branch, such policies acquire greater legitimacy. 
 
Scholars have also given some attention to the tools that parliaments and legislatures can 
employ to oversee the government and the government’s activities. Legislatures may adopt 
several tools to oversee the actions of the executive such as committee hearings; hearings in 
the plenary assembly; the creation of special inquiry committees; parliamentary questions or 
question time; the interpellations; and the ombudsman (Maffio, 2002; Pennings, 2000). 
Scholars have noted however, that the presence of an oversight tool is a necessary 
prerequisite, but an insufficient condition, for effective oversight.  Effective oversight may 
depend on the specific oversight powers given to the parliament, for example whether the 
parliament has the ability to modify legislation (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979); whether 
parliaments and parliamentarians are given the relevant information to perform their oversight 
tasks adequately (Frantzich, 1979); the role of individual MPs; the role of committee chairs; 
the saliency of issues; and how aggressively the opposition performs its role (Rockman, 
1984).4     
 
While there is a wealth of information generated by the study of legislative oversight with 
regard to the virtues, tools, and conditions necessary for effective oversight, much less has 
been written on the impact of oversight. Does oversight actually affect the functioning, and 
possibly the nature, of a political system? Over the past decade, international organizations, 
bilateral agencies, and NGOs have taken a much greater role in promoting democracy 
(Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2002; NDI, 2000). They have tried to promote democracy, among 
other things, by strengthening legislatures, and they have tried to strengthen legislatures by 
 
4 Though high partisanship and fierce opposition may be conducive to more effective oversight in general, 
studies on Public Accounts Committees have argued that co-operation between committee members across party 
lines is critical in promoting effective oversight of the public accounts (Stapenhurst et alii, 2005). 
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improving legislatures’ ability to oversee governments’ activities.5 Does oversight actually 
make a difference as international organizations have assumed?  
 
Given the nature of the data at our disposal, we were unable to test whether and to what extent 
effective oversight affects the functioning of a political regime, the democratic quality of that 
regime, or that regime’s potential to be democratic. We cannot produce this kind of analysis 
because while our data (concerning the number of oversight tools available to a given 
legislature) provide a fairly clear indication of a parliament’s oversight potential, they provide 
no indication of whether oversight is actually performed and performed effectively. Given the 
impossibility of testing the full impact of effective oversight with the data at our disposal, we 
instead tested whether oversight potential has an impact on a political system. 
 
As oversight potential increases, it becomes easier to scrutinize and control the government 
and its activities. Since control of the government is a key component of democratic 
government, the more a government is subject to potential controls, the more likely it is that 
the political system is democratic. In other words, oversight potential is a cause and not a 
consequence of democratic quality.6 Having hypothesized this possible causal relationship, 
we tested for statistical evidence sustaining the claim that the probability that a country is 
democratic increases as oversight potential increases. The next section shows statistical 
analyses on whether, and to what extent, the causal relationship between democratic quality 
and oversight potential is corroborated. 
 
 
5 Given the interest in legislative strengthening and in improving parliaments’ oversight capabilities, 
international organizations have undertaken several studies to ascertain whether oversight is beneficial to the 
functioning of a given political regime. The studies found that most countries have some instruments to oversee 
the actions of the government and that legislatures in parliamentary regimes have, on average, a greater number 
of oversight tools than legislatures in presidential and semi-presidential regimes (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 
2004a; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b). Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004b) have however emphasized that while 
the number of oversight tools that a legislature can employ to oversee the executive provides an indication of the 
oversight potential of that legislature, it does not provide any indication as to whether that oversight potential is 
then translated in effective oversight. This is why, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004b) argued, some countries may 
have great oversight potential and still be non-democratic. In these countries, legislatures have several oversight 
tools at their disposal but are either unwilling or unable to use them or use them effectively. In countries like 
Gabon, Indonesia, and Zambia, the oversight potential does not seem to have any effect on the democratic 
quality of the regime. However, the evidence presented in these international organizations’ publications was at 
best suggestive. It showed that, on average, liberal-democratic regimes had more oversight tools and oversight 
potential than formally or quasi-democratic regimes and that these, in their turn, had a greater oversight potential 
than non-democratic regimes. But while more democratic regimes tend to have, on average, more oversight tools 
than less democratic regimes, it is unclear whether the adoption of a larger number of oversight tools is a 
consequence or a cause of higher democratic quality in a given country.  
 
6 We are aware of the possibility that oversight potential, that is the number of oversight tools available to a 
given parliament in a given country, may be the consequence of that country’s democratic quality or status. To 
test this causal relationship we need to test whether the number of oversight tools changed as a consequence of 
improvements in the democratic quality or the status of a country. While we have historical data concerning how 
the quality of democracy changed in the countries included in our sample, we unfortunately do not have data on 
how the number of oversight tools has changed over time. As a result, we are not able to perform the necessary 
tests to assess how oversight potential is affected by changes in democratic quality.  
Data and findings 
 
The data on oversight tools was collected as part of a survey conducted by the World Bank 
Institute (WBI) in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).  This data has been 
presented previously in working papers by the World Bank Institute (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 
2004b; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, 2004). Parliaments of 82 countries and the European 
Parliament responded to the WBI-IPU survey questionnaire. The information provided by the 
respondents is presented in Table 1. The responses indicate that (with the exception of 
Lesotho which did not provide any information) most parliaments have several oversight tools 
at their disposal. As some respondents did not indicate whether specific oversight tools are 
used by the parliament, it is safe to conclude that the average number of oversight tools 
available to parliaments and legislatures worldwide is likely greater than the WBI-IPU survey 
suggests. 
 
Table 1. Countries and the Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools 
0 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lesotho Azerbaijan 
Russia 
Congo 
Macedonia 
Tajikistan 
Zimbabwe 
Angola  
Armenia 
China 
Ivory Coast 
Kazakhstan 
Liechtenstein 
Rwanda 
Uruguay 
Australia  
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Iran 
Jordan 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Nicaragua 
Palau 
Philippines 
Samoa 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Yemen 
Andorra  
Belarus  
Benin  
Brazil  
Canada 
Cyprus 
EU 
Germany 
Guatemala 
Guinea Bissau 
Guinea 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Korea 
Jamaica 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Namibia 
Netherlands 
Niger 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Tchad 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
U.K. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Czech Republic
Estonia 
France 
Gabon 
Greece 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Zambia 
 
Note: The score of the countries in Italics indicates that information concerning the presence/absence of 
some tools of parliamentary information was not available as indicated in Appendix. 
  
 
49 of the 83 parliaments that responded to the survey provided complete information as to the 
presence/absence of the seven oversight tools mentioned in the WBI/IPU survey.  
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The seven oversight tools are: 
 
1. Committee hearings, 
2. Hearings in plenary sittings,  
3. Inquiry commissions,  
4. Questions,  
5. Question time,  
6. Interpellations, and  
7. The ombudsman.  
 
The countries included in this 49-country sample differ with regard to the level of democracy 
(as measured by the Gastil index), income level (low income, middle income, and high 
income) and form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary). 
 
Table 2: Form of Government and Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools. 
Form of 
Government 
4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Presidential 
Ivory Coast 
Kazakhstan 
Nicaragua 
Palau 
Benin 
Brazil 
Cyprus 
Guinea 
Korea 
Chad 
Tunisia 
Costa Rica 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary  
Liechtenstein Australia 
Turkey 
Canada 
Germany 
Guinea Bissau 
Jamaica 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Belgium 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Greece 
Hungary 
Japan 
Lithuania 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
 
Semi-Presidential 
Angola 
Armenia 
Rwanda 
Cameroon 
Senegal 
Yemen 
Niger 
Togo 
Yugoslavia 
France 
Gabon 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Romania 
 
Only 47 of the 49 countries that provided complete information as to the number of oversight 
tools available to parliament also provided information on their form of government. The 
results, presented in Table 2, show that slightly less than 30 percent of the countries included 
in our 47-country sample adopt either a presidential or semi-presidential form of government, 
while 42.5 percent of the countries adopt a parliamentary form of government.  The data 
reported in Table 3 also indicate that the number of oversight tools available to legislatures in 
parliamentary systems is higher on average than the number of oversight tools available to 
legislatures in presidential or semi-presidential systems. 
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Table 3: Number of Oversight Tools by Form of Government 
 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Form of Government 4 5 6 7 Tot Mean 
Presidential 2 2 7 2 13 5.69 
Semi-Presidential 3 3 3 5 14 5.71 
Parliamentary 1 2 6 11 20 6.35 
Total 6 7 16 18 47  
 
Information concerning income level was available for all of the countries included in our 49- 
country sample. Income level was measured on the basis of the criteria used by the World 
Bank. In the World Bank’s 2002 World Development Indicators countries are divided in three 
groups:  
 
1. “High Income Economies”, in which the gross national income (GNI) per capita was 
$9,266 or more;  
2. “Middle Income Economies”, which have a GNI per capita between $ 755 and $9,265; 
and  
3. “Low Income Economies”, in which the GNI per capita is below $ 755.7  
 
The sample is fairly balanced: 30.6 percent of the countries are high-income countries; 32.6 
percent fall in the middle income category; and 36.7 percent fall in the low-income category. 
The data in Table 4 further suggest that the number of oversight tools available to parliaments 
in middle- and high-income countries is substantially higher than the number of oversight 
tools available to parliaments in low-income countries. 
 
Table 4: Number of Oversight Tools by Income Level 
 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Income Level 4 5 6 7 Total Mean 
Low 4 4 7 3 18 5.50 
Middle 1 2 5 8 16 6.25 
High  1 1 6 7 15 6.27 
Total     49  
 
Political scientists and sociologists have developed several measures of democracy (Morlino, 
1974; Bollen, 1980; Bollen, 1993). The most common and most widely adopted despite some 
shortcomings is the Gastil Index of Freedom. Diamond (1999), for example, categorized the 
world’s countries as liberal-democratic, formally democratic and non-democratic depending 
on whether these countries are ranked as free, partially free or non-free on the basis of the 
scores assigned to them by Freedom House. Freedom House computes an annual index of 
freedom for all countries worldwide. This index is computed in the following way. Freedom 
House assigns each country a political rights and a civil rights score. Both scores are on 7-
                                                 
7 We transformed this information into a quantitative variable to be used in our statistical analyses, by assigning 
value 1 to countries in the Low Income group, value 2 to countries in the Middle Income group and value 3 to 
countries in the High Income group. 
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point scales. The Gastil index is measured by adding the political rights score to the civil 
rights score and by dividing their sum by two. This means that if a country has a political 
rights score of 3 and a civil rights score of 4, the freedom score for this country is 
(3+4)/2=3.5. Countries that score from 1 to 2.5 points on this scale are considered free; 
countries scoring from 3 to 5.5 are considered as partially free and countries with a score of 
5.5 or higher are considered non-free.8 Data presented in Table 5 reveal that 55.1 percent of 
the countries included in our sample are liberal democratic; 28.6 percent are formally 
democratic; and 16.3 percent are non-democratic. 
Table 5: Number of Oversight Tools by Level of Democracy 
 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Level of Democracy 4 5 6 7 Total Mean 
Democracy 1 2 9 15 27 6.41 
Quasi Democracy 2 3 6 3 14 5.71 
Non Democracy 3 2 3  8 5.0 
Total 6 7 18 18 49  
 
The nature of the countries included in our sample allowed us to test whether, and to what 
extent, the probability that a country is formally democratic or liberal democratic is affected 
by the number of oversight tools available to the parliament, while controlling for the effects 
of the country’s form of government and income level.9
 
To test whether the probability that a country is at least formally democratic is affected by the 
number of oversight tools available, we run the following model: 
 
Logit (democracy) = a+ b1 Tools+ b2 gofor + b3 incomelevel (1) 
 
                                                 
8 We constructed a tri-chotomus variable by assigning values 1, 2 and 3 to countries that were ranked 
respectively as non-free, partially free and free. Though we realize that freedom and democracy are not exactly 
the same thing, we adopt, as is often done in the literature, the Gastil index of freedom as our measure of 
democracy, so that non-free, partially free, and free countries are treated respectively as non-democratic, 
formally democratic (or quasi democratic), and liberal democratic. 
9 We control for the effects of income level, as a proxy for development, as scholars have long acknowledged 
that democratic countries are generally better off in material terms than non-democratic ones  (Lipset, 1959). 
Lipset’s statement concerning the relationship between democracy and development received two different, 
though not mutually exclusive interpretations. For some scholars (Rueschenmeyer, Huber and Stephens, 1992) 
Lipset was arguing(as scholars working within the modernization theory framework also later argued) that 
development creates the condition for democratic transition (Huntington, 1991). Other scholars  thought that 
Lipset was positing a relationship between development and democratic consolidation. Recent research carried 
out by Przeworski et alii tested both theoretical claims. Przeworski’s work showed that the relationship between 
democracy and development is still strong (Przeworski et alii, 2000:79), that the level of development is not a 
particularly good predictor of transitions to democracy (Przeworski et alii, 2000:92-98), and that development is 
a strong predictor of democratic consolidation (Przeworski et alii, 2000:98). We also control for the effects of the 
form of government as a fairly large body of literature has argued that democratic regimes are less likely to 
consolidate in presidential democracies than they are in parliamentary systems (Linz, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; 
Sartori, 1994a; Sartori, 1994b; Stepan and Skach, 1994; Przeworski et alii, 2000: 128-137). Hence there is some 
reason to believe that the probability that a country is democratic may be influenced by the form of government 
adopted in that country.  
The democracy variable takes value 1 for countries that are at least formally democratic. The 
number of oversight tools variables ranges from 2 to 7. The gofor variable refers to the form 
of government. This variable takes value 1 for presidential systems, value 2 for semi-
presidential systems and value 3 for parliamentary systems. The incomelevel variable takes 
respectively values 1, 2 and 3 for low income, middle income and high income countries. 
 
By performing this analysis we find that our model takes the following values: 
 
Logit(democracy) = - 4.915+ .713 Tools+.053 gofor+1.487incomelevel (2) 
                                    (.008)   (.010)        (.913)          (.018) 
 
The form of government variable, as we can see from the p-values reported in parenthesis, is 
entirely insignificant and thus it is legitimate to exclude it from the model. By dropping the 
gofor variable, our model takes the following values: 
 
Logit(democracy) = - 4.958 + .775 tools + 1.262 incomelevel (3) 
                                    (.002)   (.005)           (.023) 
 
The findings are clear. Even when we control for the effects of the income level, we find that 
the coefficient for the number of oversight tools is strong and statistically significant. In a 
middle income country with seven oversight tools, the equation gives the following result: 
 
Logit(democracy) = -4.958 + .775(7) + 1.262 (2)=     
    Logit(democracy) = -4.958 + 5.425 + 2.524 = 2.991 
 
In this case, the probability that the political system of that country is democratic is  
 = .952 or 95.2 percent.  )1/(
99.299.2
ee +
 
This means that a middle income country has a phenomenally high chance of being at least 
formally democratic when all seven oversight tools are available to the parliament. The data 
presented in Table 6 provide a clear indication of how (and how much) the probability that a 
country is at least formally democratic increases as the number of oversight tools available to 
the parliament increases.  
 
Table 6: Number of Oversight Tools and the probability that a country is formally democratic 
If in a middle income country the number of 
oversight tools is 
The probability that a country is formally 
democratic is: 
0 .08 
1 .16 
2 .29 
3 .47 
4 .66 
5 .81 
6 .90 
7 .95 
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Diamond (1999) noted that formal democracies are effectively quasi democracies. They have 
the forms, the mechanisms, and the institutions that can be found in properly democratic 
regimes, but they do not really function like real democracies. Therefore, we shifted the focus 
of our analysis to investigate whether the probability that a country is liberal democratic 
changes as the number of oversight tools available to that country’s parliament increases. In 
order to test whether the probability that a country is liberal democratic is affected by the 
number of oversight tools, we ran the following logistic regression model: 
 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = a + b1Tools +b2 Incomelevel (4) 
 
The liberaldemocracy variable takes value 1 for countries that are ranked as free by the Gastil 
index of freedom, while it takes a value of 0 (zero) otherwise. Both the tools variable and the 
incomelevel variable take the values specified above. With these considerations in mind, 
when we run our model we find that it takes the following values: 
 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = -7.193 + .576 tools + 2.162 incomelevel (5) 
                                                               (.000)     (.036)           (.000) 
 
The coefficient for our tools variable is still positive, and still fairly strong, but it is not as 
statistically significant as the incomelevel variable. It should also be noted that the tools 
variable in the equation (5) is weaker and much less significant than in the equation model 
(3). Be that as it may, the greater the number of oversight tools in a middle income country, 
the greater the probability that the country is liberal democratic. Compare what happens if we 
compare the probability that a middle income country is liberal democratic when it has only 
two oversight tools with the probability that a middle income country is liberal democratic 
when it has seven oversight tools. When a middle income country has only two oversight 
tools, our equation (5) takes the following values: 
 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = -7.193 + .576 (2) + 2.162 (2) =  -1.72  (6) 
This means that the probability that such a country is liberal democratic is:  = 
.152 or 15.2 per cent. 
)1/(
72.172.1 −−
+ ee
 
When a middle income country has instead seven oversight tools, our equation (5) takes the 
following values: 
 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = -7.193 + .576 (7) + 2.162 (2) = 1.16 (7) 
This means that the probability that such a country is liberal democratic is: 
)1/(
16.116.1
ee +  = .762 or 76.2 per cent. 
 
As we can see from the data presented in Table 7, as the number of oversight tools increases, 
the probability that a country is liberal democratic also increases, but this increase is not as 
marked as the probability that a country is only formally democratic. While there is about a 95 
percent probability that a middle income country with seven oversight tools is formally 
democratic, the probability that this same country is liberal democratic is just 76.2 percent 
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Table 7: Number of Oversight Tools and the probability that a country is liberal democratic 
If in a middle income country the number of 
oversight tools is 
The probability that a country is liberal-democratic 
is: 
0 .05 
1 .09 
2 .15 
3 .24 
4 .36 
5 .50 
6 .64 
7 .76 
 
These findings clearly indicate that a parliament’s oversight potential, as measured by the 
number of oversight tools, makes a difference as to whether that country is liberal democratic. 
Our data also reveal that the oversight potential exercises greater influence on the probability 
that a country is formally democratic than on the probability that a country is liberal 
democratic. Why? The data at our disposal do not allow us to answer this question 
conclusively, but we can nonetheless formulate some educated guesses as to why the 
relationship between oversight potential and the probability that a country is liberal 
democratic is more tenuous.  
 
Liberal democracy needs not only oversight potential, but real and effective oversight 
implementation. This is the major difference between formally democratic and liberal 
democratic regimes. In formally democratic regimes democratic institutions may have only a 
cosmetic function. They are present but they are not effectively used. This may be the case for 
oversight tools as well. Parliaments in formally democratic regimes may adopt oversight tools 
but these tools may not be used, or may not be used effectively. In formal democracies, the 
form of democratic government is respected but not its substance. 
 
By contrast, liberal democracies are concerned with the substance of democracy. The 
presence of oversight tools, or oversight potential, is not enough. What is peculiar to liberal 
democratic regimes is the fact that governments are not only empowered to perform their 
duties and tasks but that they are also subject to control. Governments have the power to 
govern but this power is constrained as they are required, or at the very least are asked, to 
provide justifications for their actions or inactions. In parliamentary systems, if a government 
fails to justify their course of action to the legislature, it risks being voted out of office.  
 
While the presence of oversight tools is a necessary condition for effective oversight, it is not, 
by itself, sufficient. In addition to parliaments’ oversight potential, the political will must exist 
to oversee government activities. In his study of Public Accounts Committees, McGee (2002) 
showed that one of the major obstacles that Public Accounts Committee face in their attempt 
to oversee governments’ accounts is that parliamentarians are unwilling to engage in serious 
oversight of government accounts.10 The job of scrutinizing government accounts may be 
                                                 
10 In spite of the fact that Public Accounts Committees are proper oversight committees, that is committees 
established to oversee government accounts, the list of oversight tools considered by the WBI-IPU survey did 
not include the Public Accounts Committees. On Public Accounts Committees see also Wehner (2003; 2005). 
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considered as giving little visibility to MPs, and that may be a disincentive for members 
seeking to be re-elected. Worse, MPs belonging to the governing party (or coalition) may fear 
that by scrutinizing government’s accounts they will be forced to chose between performing 
their oversight functions effectively (possibly straining the relationship between an MP and its 
party) and preserving a strong tie to their party.11 Therefore, in parliaments with Public 
Accounts Committees, the presence of these committees is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for effective scrutiny of government accounts. If this conclusion could be extended 
from the particular case of the Public Account Committees to the oversight tools in general, it 
could equally explain why the presence of oversight tools does not necessarily amount to 
effective oversight—which is what is needed for a country to be considered liberal 
democratic. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the relationship between the number of oversight 
tools available to a parliament on the one hand and the probability that a country is formally 
democratic and/or liberal democratic on the other hand. Analyzing the survey data collected 
by the WBI in collaboration with the IPU, we found that the number of oversight tools 
available to a country’s parliament is a strong predictor of whether that country is at least 
formally democratic. Our findings indicate that the probability that a country is formally 
democratic increases as the number of oversight tools increases. In this respect we found that 
when a middle income country has all of the seven oversight tools for which the WBI-IPU 
survey sought information available to its parliament, there is a 95 percent probability that the 
country is formally democratic. We also found that the probability that a country is liberal 
democratic increases as the number of oversight tools available to the parliament increases. 
However, we observed that the relationship between oversight potential and liberal 
democracy is neither as strong nor as significant as the relationship between formal 
democracy and oversight potential. This difference may be explained by the fact that liberal 
democratic regimes are concerned not only with the formal aspects of democracy such as the 
presence of democratic mechanisms and institutions, but also with the substance of 
democracy. Liberal democracies are not satisfied with oversight potential, rather they seek 
effective oversight implementation. Furthermore parliaments need the political will to 
exercise oversight effectively. 
 
These findings suggest two additional considerations. First, our analyses, by showing that 
increased legislative oversight is good for democracy, confirm what several international 
organizations have often assumed, namely that strengthening legislatures (and legislature’s 
oversight potential) is good for democracy building. Legislatures also contribute significantly 
to democratic governance. By performing their oversight function, parliaments play a major 
role in keeping governments responsive and accountable for their actions, and are thus 
instrumental in preventing abuses of power. Second, our analyses further suggest that while 
international organizations are correct in arguing that strengthening legislatures is critical for 
the promotion and consolidation of democracy, they may need to reconsider their legislative 
 
11 The reasons why partisanship may represent a major obstacle to the proper functioning of Public Accounts 
Committees are discussed by Stapenhurst et alii (2005). 
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strengthening strategies (NDI 2000; NDI, 2001; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b). In the past 
programs focused mainly on strengthening legislatures’ oversight potential.  Yet parliaments 
must have not only the tools but also the political will to oversee the government. Only then 
can they move from formal to liberal democracy because liberal democracy requires effective 
oversight implementation and not just oversight potential. The major challenge for the 
international organizations concerned with the promotion and consolidation of democracy is 
to identify and promote the conditions under which parliaments and parliamentarians are 
more likely to engage in effective oversight of government activities. 
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Introduction 
 
The collapse of many authoritarian regimes in the course of what Samuel Huntington called 
“the third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991) and the democratic transitions in 
Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and Asia, have generated an increasing interest 
among political scientists for what Giovanni Sartori calls “constitutional engineering” 
(Sartori, 1994a)12.  Political scientists are paying new, and increasing, attention to which 
institutions are more likely to lead to the consolidation of democracies that emerged in this 
‘third wave’ (Stepan and Skach, 1994:119). More specifically, political scientists have 
investigated whether and to what extent democratic consolidation or democratic collapse is 
affected by the form of government. 
 
In the course of this debate several positions have emerged. Juan Linz (1994) posited that the 
parliamentary form of government better suits democracy and democracy’s consolidation.  He 
argued that the presidential form of government, because of its rigidity and the dual 
legitimacy of the executive and the legislative, is less likely to sustain democracy. Przeworski 
and others (1997:301) have provided extensive empirical evidence supporting Linz’s 
argument.  They showed through statistical analysis that the probability of a democratic 
breakdown in countries with a presidential form of government is three times higher than it is 
in countries with a parliamentary form of government.  At the same time, Scott Mainwaring 
underlined that the survival of democratic regimes under the presidential form of government 
is only in danger when coupled with a hyper-fragmented party system (Mainwaring, 1993: 
198-228)13.  
  
While political scientists investigated which forms of government are more likely to ensure 
the survival of democratic regimes, several international organizations began to investigate 
the relationship between democracies and institutions. Organizations such as the World Bank 
 
12 A transition is the period between the crisis or the collapse of a political regime and the establishment of a new 
one. A transition is a democratic transition when it ends with the establishment of a democratic regime. A 
democratic transition is also called democratization. There is a wave of democratization when the number of 
countries in transition from a non-democratic system to a democratic one outnumbers the countries moving in 
the opposite direction. See Huntington (1991:15). 
13 This evidence has led many political scientists to believe that the presidential form of government is less likely 
to sustain the survival of a democratic regime and that therefore, parliamentarism is the best form of democratic 
government. Giovanni Sartori (1994a; 1994b:107) has noted however that the fact that presidentialism is not 
good for democracy does not make parliamentarism the ‘good alternative’. Parliamentary governments may be 
unstable and inefficient, and their instability and ineffectiveness may lead to a regime breakdown. Historical 
examples of this include the Weimar Republic, ,the French Fourth Republic,, and the Spanish Republic—on this 
see Sartori (1976) or Pelizzo-Babones (2005).  A critical assessment of the criticisms of presidentialism can be 
found in Shugart and Carey (1992:28-54).  
 18
                                                
Institute (WBI) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are paying increasing 
attention to legislatures and the role they can play in consolidating democracy, improving 
governance, curbing corruption, and, ultimately, reducing poverty (National Democratic 
Institute, 200; Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2002; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a; Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst, 2004b; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, 2004). 
 
International organizations have adopted an interesting approach to the study of legislatures. 
They acknowledge that modern political systems are often characterized by a sort of 
“executive dominance” or “executive preeminence”.  This means that governments have the 
political and the legislative initiative, and they have the competence, the information, and the 
know-how necessary to analyze pressing problems and formulate policies and solutions.  
Meanwhile, parliaments and legislatures perform more of an oversight function. They 
evaluate the virtues (or the lack thereof) of government policies; keep governments in check, 
prevent governments from abusing their power; examine and assess the merits of 
governments’ legislative proposals, and vote to amend, approve or reject them. In addition to 
this ex ante oversight function (oversight which is exercised before a policy is enacted) 
parliaments and legislatures also perform an ex post oversight function as they are in charge 
of overseeing policy implementation. Parliaments ensure that policies are implemented as 
they were approved by the legislature.  
 
The above suggests that legislatures and parliaments may be less capable of initiating policies 
than they were in the past, but that they counterbalance this loss of political initiative by 
performing an increasing oversight role. International organizations are thus paying increasing 
attention to which institutional instruments may help legislators and legislatures to oversee 
governments’ actions and activities (National Democratic Institute, 200; Stapenhurst and 
Pelizzo, 2002; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b; Pelizzo, 
Stapenhurst and Olson, 2004). The interest in Public Accounts Committees (PACs) originated 
within this context. This paper will first look closely at PACs, how they are established and 
institutionalized, and the functions that they perform.  The paper will also analyze a selection 
of survey data collected by WBI in collaboration with the World Bank’s South Asia Region 
Financial Management unit (SARFM) to assess the good functioning of the PACs and factors 
that enable good functioning. 
 
Public Accounts Committees (PACs) 
 
PACs are one of the instruments that parliaments can use to check governments’ activities14. 
These committees, first instituted in the United Kingdom by a resolution of the House of 
Commons in 1861, are now fairly common in the countries of the Commonwealth. In general 
PACs are parliamentary standing committees of the Lower House. However there are some 
 
14 Although they are generally called Public Accounts Committees, the PAC may sometimes take different 
names. For example in the Seychelles, they are called Committees of finances and public accounts (art. 104(1a) 
of the Constitution. In the Cook Islands they are called Public Expenditures Committees (art.71 (3) of the 
Constitution). However, it is important to note that in spite of the fact that they may assume different names, the 
PACs all perform the same set of functions.. 
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exceptions to this general trend. In Australia and in India, for example, the PAC is a bicameral 
committee.  
 
PACs may be institutionalized in different ways. A PAC may be established by a country’s 
constitution. This is the case in Antigua and Barbuda (art. 98 of the 1981 Constitution); 
Bangladesh (art. 76 of the 1972 Constitution); the Cook Islands (art. 71(3) of the 
Constitution); Kiribati (art. 115 of the Constitutions); the Seychelles (art. 104(1a) of the 
Constitution); Saint Vincent (art. 76 of the 1979 Constitution), Trinidad and Tobago (art. 119 
of the 1976 Constitution); and Zambia (art. 103(5) of the Constitution).15 There is a second 
group of countries in which PACs are institutionalized by the standing order of the assembly. 
PACs were instituted respectively by art. 70(2) of the Standing Order of the Parliament in 
Guyana; by art. 89 of the Standing Orders in Tanzania; by art. 122 (1) of the Standing Orders 
in Uganda; by art. 108(3) of the Standing Orders in Canada; by art. 120E of the Standing 
Orders in Malta; by art. 69 of the Standing Orders in Jamaica; and by the articles 308 and 309 
of the Rules of Procedures in India. There is a third group of countries, which includes 
Australia and the United Kingdom, in which the PAC is instituted by an Act of Parliament—
respectively the Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act 1951 in Australia (consolidated 
on November 6, 1997) and the National Audit Act in the United Kingdom (1861). 
 
The number of members in a PAC varies from country to country. There are seven members 
in Malta, seventeen in Canada, and twenty-two in India16. Interestingly, despite the size of the 
membership, the distribution of seats within a PAC corresponds, as much as possible, to the 
distribution of seats in the whole assembly. This means that the government party (or the 
government coalition) controls a majority of the seats in the PAC. 
 
 To counterbalance the power of the majority in the PAC, the opposition party is generally 
given the Chairmanship of the PAC.  David McGee notes that “in two-thirds of the cases 
PACs are chaired by an opposition member” (McGee, 2002:66). McGee underlines that in 
countries such as the United Kingdom or India, this practice is the result of “a very strong 
convention” (McGee, 2002:66). In other countries it is codified by the same norms and rules 
that establish the PAC itself. For example, art. 120E(4) of the Standing Orders of Malta’s 
Parliament establishes “one of the members nominated by the Leader of the Opposition and 
so designated by him in consultation with the Leader of the House shall be appointed as 
Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee”.  Similarly art. 87(5) of the Standing Orders of 
the Tanzanian Parliament establishes that “the Chairperson for the Public Account Committee 
shall be elected from amongst the Members of the Committee from the Opposition”. 
 
That the Chairmanship of the PAC is given to an opposition member performs two basic 
functions. First, it re-equilibrates the balance of power between the government and the 
opposition. Second, it performs a symbolic function. The fact that the Chairperson of the PAC 
is an opposition member indicates the willingness of both the majority and the minority to 
operate within the PAC in a bipartisan manner. 
 
15 It is worth noting that the PAC in Trinidad and Tobago is established by both art. 119 of the Constitution and  
art. 72 of the Standing Orders. 
16 Of these 22 members, 15 are members of the Lok Sahba and 7 are members of the Rajya Sahba. 
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Australia represents an interesting exception to this general trend. In Australia, the 
Chairperson of the PAC is generally an MP from the parliamentary majority. This choice is 
motivated by the fact that “in Australia it is considered advantageous to have a government 
Member as Chair, as this can assist with the implementation of the PAC’s recommendations. 
It is regarded as the duty of the Chair to advocate that the PAC’s recommendations be taken 
up and implemented by the government. This can involve behind the scenes work persuading 
reluctant ministers to act. A government Member can do this more effectively than an 
opposition Member who as political opponent will not have the confidence of the ministers” 
(McGee, 2002:66). 
 
Role and Functions of the PACs 
 
PACs are standing committees which help Parliament oversee the activities performed by the 
Government.  Like any other standing committee, a PAC has the power to investigate and 
examine all the issues that are referred to it by the parliament17. A PAC can also investigate 
specific issues such as government accountability to Parliament regarding expenses approved 
by the government; effectiveness and efficiency of government enacted policies; and the 
quality of the administration. 
 
To fulfill its role, the PAC is given additional and more specific powers, such as the power to 
examine the public accounts, the comments on the public accounts, and all the reports drafted 
by the Auditor General and the National Audit Office. The PAC also has the power to conduct 
investigations (directly or indirectly); to receive all the documentation that it considers 
necessary to adequately perform its functions; to invite government members to attend PAC 
meetings and to respond to questions; to give publicity to the PAC’s conclusions; to report to 
the Parliament; and to present the PAC’s recommendations to the government. 
 
The Success of PACs 
 
The WBI and the SARFM surveyed 33 Chairs of Public Accounts Committees from national 
and sub-national parliaments in the Commonwealth. This paper presents the data generated in 
the course of this survey.  Until recently, very little was known about the effectiveness of 
PACs. No comparative study had systematically investigated whether, and to what extent, 
PACs actually contribute to effective oversight of government activities and expenses. The 
survey conducted by the WBI, and the SARFM, has generated fairly interesting data. The 
survey data can be used to perform two tasks. First, the data may be used to assess results 
achieved by the PACs under specific conditions. Second the data may be used to assess which 
conditions and factors may help PACs work well. 
 
Looking at the data on the success of the PACs, it is important to note that their success rate 
varies significantly depending on the nature of the results they seek to achieve. For example, 
while 78.8 percent of the Chairpersons surveyed reported that the recommendations 
 
17 Or by the president of the Chamber as in Tanzania. 
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formulated by the PAC are frequently accepted by the government, only 63.6 percent of 
respondents stated that the recommendations formulated by the PAC are frequently 
implemented. Conversely, while only 15.2 percent of the respondents reported that the PAC’s 
recommendations are rarely accepted, 27.3 percent of respondents indicated that the 
recommendations formulated by the PAC are rarely implemented by the government. Data are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Results achieved by the PAC: how frequently has the PAC achieved the following result?  
Result achieved Frequently Rarely of N 
Recommendations accepted 78.8 15.2 33 
Recommendations implemented 63.6 27.3 33 
Better information 60.8 18.2 33 
Disciplinary action 27.3 15.2 33 
Modification of legislation 15.2 54.5 33 
 
Further analysis of the data suggests some additional considerations. For more than 60 percent 
of respondents, the government frequently provides better information to the parliament in the 
light of the PAC’s recommendations. However it is rare that the actions, suggestions and 
recommendations of the PAC lead to disciplinary action against public officials who have 
violated the existing rules and norms. Less than one-third of respondents reported that 
disciplinary action occurs frequently in the wake of the PAC’s recommendations.  It is also 
worth noting that the government rarely modifies its legislation and legislative proposals in 
light of the PAC’s recommendations and suggestions. 
 
The Determinants of a PAC’s Success 
 
The WBI/SARFM survey did not simply ask whether, to what extent, and how PACs are 
effective or successful. It also attempted to assess which conditions facilitate the good 
functioning and the success of PACs. 
 
The survey administrators provided a list of 37 factors which could be considered as possible 
determinants of a PAC’s success.  Respondents were then asked to indicate how much 
importance they attached to each of these factors, that is whether they considered the factors 
to be very important, somewhat important or not important. These factors fell into one of the 
following three categories: the composition of the commission; the powers of the 
commission; and the practices of the commission. Respondents were also asked to identify 
which conditions could prevent the successful functioning of a PAC.  
 
Composition of the Commission 
 
Only two of the 37 factors in the above-mentioned list belong to this first category: 
 
1.  ‘balanced representation of all major political parties in the commission’   
2. ‘exclusion of government members from the commission’ 
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The importance of this second factor is clear. The mission of a PAC is to investigate the 
activities of the government, especially with regard to the use of public funds and resources. 
In order to perform its oversight activity, the PAC has to be free to conduct its business 
without any government interference. This condition (freedom from government interference) 
could be difficult to achieve if government members were also serving as members of the 
PAC.  If MPs already serving in the cabinet were allowed to serve on the PAC, they might try 
to slow down or mislead the investigative action of the commission in order to protect the 
cabinet in which they also serve.  
 
Even assuming that MPs, serving in the cabinet, do not mislead or slow down the PAC in the 
performance of its duties, their membership in the PAC would still pose a problem for the 
proper functioning of the committee.  The study by McGee (2002) revealed that PACs are not 
the most appealing commissions on which MPs can serve. Some MPs fear that serving on a 
PAC requires a great amount of work without providing much visibility.  Membership in a 
PAC may also be seen as not being adequately rewarded at the ballot box – in other words 
there may be little or no electoral incentive to serve on a PAC. The absence of electoral 
incentives is coupled with the absence of partisan incentives (or the presence of partisan 
disincentives). MPs fear that serving on a PAC may cause them trouble with their own 
respective parties. MPs, belonging to the majority party (or coalition) often worry that serving 
in a PAC might force them to choose between loyally serving the party (by not performing 
their committee duties) and loyally serving the PAC (potentially alienating their own party). If 
MPs with appointments in the cabinet were allowed to serve in the PAC, their presence in the 
committee would provide a further incentive to the younger MPs to favor partisan interests 
over committee interests. The committee would thus end up functioning in a partisan manner. 
As composition of the committee is fairly proportional, it reflects the distribution of seats in 
the assembly as a whole, and in parliamentary systems the government party (or coalition) 
controls the majority of the parliamentary seats. Hence, as soon as the PAC starts operating in 
a partisan fashion, the government would be able to control the PAC and avoid parliamentary 
oversight.  
 
There is a third reason why cabinet ministers (and under-secretaries) should not be allowed to 
serve on a PAC. Even assuming that the presence of government officials in the PAC does not 
negatively affect its functioning, it certainly affects the credibility of the PAC and its 
deliberations—which are the PAC’s true assets. For these reasons, government members 
should not be allowed to serve on the PAC. 
 
Table 2: Success and Composition of the PAC. How important is this factor?  
Factor Very 
Important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Proportional representation of the various 
parliamentary parties  
86.2 10.3 3.4 29 
Exclusion of MPs with cabinet posts 85.2 14.8 0 27 
 
Table 2 shows that while some respondents have not assessed the importance of the 
composition of the PAC as a condition for a PAC’s success, the majority believe that the 
composition of the PAC is a crucial factor in making PACs work and work well. Excluding 
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MPs serving in the cabinet from the PAC is considered important or very important by 
respectively 14.8 and 85.2 percent of respondents. Similarly, the proportional representation 
of parliamentary parties in the PAC is considered to be important or very important by 10.3 
and 86.2 percent of the respondents respectively. Interestingly, while 3.4 percent of the 
respondents said that proportional representation of parties in the PAC is not important, none 
of the respondents considered the exclusion of government members as not important.  
 
Powers of the Committee 
 
The survey, asked the 33 PAC Chairs to indicate how important certain powers and/or 
characteristics were for the success of the PAC. Respondents were given a list of 17 powers or 
characteristics, and asked to indicate whether they considered these powers as very important, 
important or not important. 
 
Analysis of the survey data reveals that the importance of certain powers or characteristics is 
almost unanimously acknowledged. For example, the power to formulate suggestions and to 
publish them; the power to choose which topics should be investigated without having to 
accept orders or suggestions from the government; and the power to investigate all the current 
and the past expenses deliberated by the executive are almost unanimously considered as 
important or very important. All respondents also considered as important or very important 
that the PAC have a clear focus on keeping the government accountable for the use of public 
money. 
 
It should be noted that while a large percentage of respondents did not consider whether the 
PAC has the power to summon the cabinet ministers before it as important, they almost 
unanimously considered important or very important that the PAC has the power to force 
witnesses to respond to questions. More than 93 percent of the respondents indicated that the 
power to force witnesses to respond to questions is important or very important. Further 
details are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Success and Powers of PACs. How Important is this factors? Percentages. 
Power of the Committee Very 
important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Formulate recommendations and publish the 
conclusions  
97 3 0 33 
Investigate all past and present expenses  93.5 6.5 0 31 
Choose topics for investigation without 
following the suggestions of the  government 
90.9 9.1 0 33 
Focus on keeping government accountable 
for spending 
90.9 9.1 0 33 
Force witnesses to answer questions e 87.1 6.45 6.45 33 
Examine the budget of the Legislative 
Auditor 
58.8 35.3 23.5 17 
Force cabinet ministers to appear before the 
committee  
55 15 45 33 
View the proposed legislation or the 
amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 
47.8 30.4 21.8 23 
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Success and Practices of the PAC 
 
There is a third set of factors that may facilitate the success or the effectiveness of PACs in 
performing their tasks. This third set of factors is based on practices adopted by PACs 
themselves and their members.  
 
In order to identify which practices and dynamics could improve the performance of PACs 
and make them more successful, the survey asked respondents to assess the importance of the 
18 practices. 
 
Two practices were considered to be particularly important for the success of PACs. 
Respondents reported that keeping the records or the proceedings of meetings was one the 
most important ways to improve the PAC’s performance. Respondents also noted that the 
PAC’s performance was greatly enhanced when members of the PAC did their homework 
before attending the PAC’s meetings. Both practices were considered as important or very 
important by 97 percent of respondents although keeping the transcripts of the sessions was 
considered to be slightly more important than doing homework. In fact, while preparation 
for/before the meeting is considered as very important by 78.8 percent of the respondents, 
keeping the transcripts is considered to be very important by 87.9 percent of the respondents. 
 
The existence of procedures and mechanisms to assess whether the government actually 
implements the recommendations formulated by the PAC is also considered as an important 
condition for success of the PAC. The existence of such procedures was considered as 
important or very important by more than 93 percent of respondents. Further details can be 
found in Table 4. 
 
Bipartisanship and the bipartisan functioning of the PAC are considered as the fourth most 
important practice (or dynamic) for the success of a PAC. More than 90 percent of 
respondents indicated as important or very important that there is a close working relationship 
between committee members regardless of their partisan affiliation. 
 
This is an interesting result, particularly if considered in light of what was noted above. The 
data presented above revealed that the importance of certain powers at the disposal of PACs 
was unanimously acknowledged. Yet a small percentage of PAC Chairs considered 
parliamentary parties’ representation in a PAC as unnecessary for a PAC’s success. Why?  On 
reason may be that a PAC is by its very nature a committee in which partisan divisions should 
be sidelined (Rockman, 1984). In order for a PAC to work and work well, it needs to function 
in a bi-partisan or rather non-partisan manner18. If MPs serving in a PAC must behave in a 
non-partisan fashion, the importance of their partisan affiliation decreases and it may be 
argued that therefore the importance of a proportional representation of the various 
parliamentary parties also decreases.  
 
18 In order to create this close working relationship between a PACs’ members from the various parties, some 
parliaments request that all the PAC’s decisions be unanimous. According to McGee, 33 percent of the national 
and sub-national parliaments in the Commonwealth request that the PAC’s decisions be unanimous.   McGee 
(2002:98).   
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It is worth noting that not all practices are regarded as important for the good functioning or 
success of the PACs. As shown in Table 5, almost one third of respondents indicated that 
economic incentives provided t members serving on the PAC were not important for a PAC’s 
success. 
 
Table 4: Are Practices and Procedures important for the Success of a PAC? The most important 
practices.  (Percentages) 
Pratice of the Commttee very important Important Not important N 
Keeping the transcripts of the 
meetings 
87.9 9.1 3.0 33 
Preparation before Committee 
Meetings 
78.8 18.2 3.0 33 
Procedures to determine whether the 
government has taken any step to 
implement the recommendations of 
the Committee  
75.0 18.7 6.3 32 
Close working relationship between 
the members of the various political 
parties  
75.0 15.6 9.4 32 
 
In addition, more than one third of respondents considered the establishment of sub-
committees (to help the PACs perform their tasks) as unimportant. Respondents tended to 
agreed that the political and the professional experiences of the PAC’s members have little 
impact on the functioning and success of the PAC.  Experience in business or administration 
was considered as unimportant by more than one-third of respondents.  Similarly, previous 
experience in other parliamentary committees was considered as unimportant by almost 42 
percent of the respondents. Finally, broadcasting the PACs meetings was considered the least 
important practice.  
 
Table 5: The Least Important Practices and Dynamics for the Success of the PAC.   (Percentages). 
Practice of the Committee Not important N 
TV Broadcastingof the meetings  52.0 19 
PAC members with at least 2 years of experience in any 
parliamentary committee  
41.7 24 
PAC members with administrative or business experience 35.7 28 
Creation of sub-committees  35.3 17 
Extra money or additional incentives for  members to 
participate in the meetings scheduled outside the normal 
legislative session 
31.8 22 
 
 
Obstacles to the good functioning of the PAC 
 
The survey data presented in this paper provide useful indications as to which institutional 
factors facilitate the good functioning and success of PACs. However, oversight potential 
does not necessarily translate in effective oversight. Which conditions may prevent the PACs 
from functioning effectively? 
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The first obstacle to the good functioning of a PAC is partisanship, that is some PAC 
members operating with a partisan spirit and using the investigative powers of the PAC to 
promote their own political fortunes (along with those of their respective parties). This 
problem is not necessarily due to institutional factors; rather it is a behavioral problem. 
However, in so far as institutions provide incentives for (political) behavior, it may be 
possible to find institutional solutions to these problems. For example, in order to minimize 
the risk of partisan conflicts within a PAC, many parliaments assign the PAC’s Chairmanship 
to a member of the opposition. In the Australian case, where the PAC’s Chairperson is a 
member of the majority party, the importance of reaching unanimous decisions on suggestions 
and recommendations is greatly emphasized. In order to minimize partisan tensions within the 
PAC, many parliaments stress that the PAC’s mandate is not that of assessing the political 
value or content of the policies enacted by the government, but instead assessing whether 
policies are implemented in an efficient and effective manner. However none of these 
solutions by themselves are sufficient to ensure bipartisan cooperation.  What else can be 
done? 
 
When members join a PAC they could be asked to underwrite a (formal or informal) code of 
conduct in which they pledge their loyalty to the good, non-partisan functioning of the 
committee. Their word would be considered binding and the PAC’s Chairpersons could use 
this pledge to induce members to perform their functions and respect their institutional duties. 
 
A second, and more serious, problem for the effectiveness of the PAC’s activity is r that 
governments may have little interest in (if not open aversion to) parliamentary oversight of 
their activities. Governments may consider parliamentary oversight as an intrusion in their 
sphere of influence. Similarly governments may think that PACs are not sufficiently informed 
or competent enough to formulate suggestions, criticisms and observations. This is a serious 
problem as it indicates poor understanding of the functions that the executive and legislative 
branches perform in parliamentary systems. 
 
In parliamentary systems, the government governs and the parliament ensures that the 
government is governing well. When governments try to avoid parliamentary controls, or 
when governments consider parliamentary controls merely as obstacles to effective 
government action, they misunderstand the principle the principle of parliamentary oversight. 
 
This said, it is important to keep in mind that this imperfect understanding represents a 
problem is not confined to newly established democracies, or democratizing regimes, which 
have a fairly limited experience in the functioning of democratic institutions. It also exists in 
well established and consolidated democracies. The Australian case is, in this respect, rather 
emblematic. Between 1932 and 1951, the PAC of the Australian Parliament did not meet 
because the government – which could not see what benefits would come out of the meetings 
of this committee – decided that meetings of this committee were unnecessary. This important 
problem can be solved only by inducing governments to be respectful of PACs and their 
activities. 
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A final observation is in order at this point. The good functioning of PACs is seriously 
threatened in those countries in which corruption and other forms of improper behavior (such 
as the conflict of interest) are tolerated. In fact, if there is no demand for good governance –
efficient, effective, transparent and honest governance - by civil society and others, the 
political class does not have any incentive to use the available parliamentary oversight 
mechanisms to check and possibly improve the quality of governance.    
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to discuss one of the oversight tools adopted in the countries of 
the Commonwealth—Public Account Committees. The paper looked at what these 
committees are; how and by whom they are instituted; how they function; results they are able 
to achieve (and therefore how they influence the political system); and the conditions which 
promote PACs good functioning and success. 
 
The analysis was performed based on the assumption that parliamentary control of 
government activities can prevent governments from abusing their powers and thus contribute 
to the promotion of good governance. In other words, it was assumed that parliaments and 
parliamentarians are the agents of good governance. In many countries, this is indeed the case. 
Parliaments and parliamentarians play an important role in the promotion of good governance.  
 
However, while parliaments control governments (and their activities), they must be 
controlled in their turn. In the absence of such controls, how would one know whether 
parliamentary control of the executive is truly exercised for the good of the country and not 
for the good of few individuals? This point should receive more attention in the future. In 
order to ensure the success of a PAC (as well as that of the other instruments of parliamentary 
oversight), the morality (or ethical standards) of a PAC and its members must be above 
suspicion. This is the first step towards establishing a viable system of good governance.  
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Legislative Oversight and the Israeli Committee 
System: Problems and Solutions 
 
Chen Friedberg 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The nineteen century English philosopher John Stuart Mill determined that the most 
appropriate tasks of a representative body are to: oversee the government, clarify its activities 
to the public, compel the executive to provide full explanations and justification for its deeds, 
criticize it and, in extreme cases, withdraw support (Mill 1958). One of the ways Parliament 
can fulfill its oversight role is through its committees, which have been formed in large part to 
strengthen the role of the legislature and to protect democratic regimes by ensuring the 
existence of proper governmental and administrational order (Lees and Shaw 1979, Hazan 
2001, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004).   
 
This paper looks at parliamentary oversight by the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, through its 
committee system. It centers on the structural and procedural problems which characterize the 
Israeli parliamentary committee system, and which impair the effectiveness of its oversight.  
This is demonstrated by examining the functioning of two committees: (i) the State Control 
Committee and (ii) the Education and Culture Committee. 
 
The Knesset and its Oversight Role 
 
The Knesset is a House of Representatives with 120 Members elected for a four-year term. 
One of the functions of the Knesset is to oversee the government (ministerial cabinet), most of 
whose ministers and deputy ministers are also elected Knesset members. The Knesset fulfills 
its supervisory role in various ways:  
 
¾ Every law that the government intends to enact must be approved by the Knesset, 
including the budget and taxation laws.  
¾ The Knesset may also demand that the government provides additional information, 
either within the framework of its committee system or in the plenum - by means of 
debates, motions for the agenda, or parliamentary questions.  
¾ An additional means of supervision are the State Comptroller’s reports, which are 
presented to the Knesset. 
 
The Parliamentary Committee System in the Knesset 
 
The Israeli government is based on coalitions and membership in the committees is on 
parliamentary group basis. The number of Knesset members who are free to serve on 
committees is limited to about 80, while possible nominations for Knesset committees can 
reach about 200.  
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There are four types of Knesset committees: permanent committees, special committees, 
committees on a particular matter, and parliamentary inquiry committees: 
  
¾ Permanent committees (discussed in detail below) 
¾ Parliamentary inquiry committees are appointed by the plenum to deal with special issues 
of national importance. 
¾ Special committees include two permanent committees, the Ethics Committee and the 
Interpretations Committee, which have a different status to that of the permanent 
committees. 
¾ Committees on particular matters function in a similar manner to the permanent 
committees but are appointed for a limited period of time. 
 
There are also subcommittees established on a temporary basis in order to deal with specific 
issues that demand more intense attention. 
 
The Knesset committees draw their power from two legal sources: (i) the Knesset 
Parliamentary Rules of Procedure and (ii) the Basic Law: the Knesset (1958). 
 
Permanent Committees 
 
There are twelve permanent committees. The permanent committees and their chairmen are 
elected at the beginning of the term of each Knesset on the basis of a recommendation by the 
Arrangements Committee. Membership in the committees is on a Parliamentary Group basis. 
The number of members in each committee has changed over the years (ranging from 10 to 
20 members). It should be noted that the number of Knesset committees and their size 
enables, at least in theory, more efficient oversight of the executive.  However committee 
structure and other factors often hinder the committees’ ability so implement effective 
oversight.  
 
Structural and Procedural Failures Characterizing the Israeli Committee System 
 
¾ Lack of association between committees and government ministries.  Each 
permanent committee is responsible for a number of, or sometimes all, 
governmental ministries. As committees are forced to cover a wide variety of 
government activities under several ministries, committee members are often 
unable to focus on, and gain in depth expertise in, an area of a specific 
government ministry.  
 
¾ The ability of parties to change committee members as desired.  Knesset 
Parliamentary Procedures permit parties to change their committee 
representatives whenever they wish. Parties do so particularly when one of 
their committee members expresses an opinion in opposition to the position of 
the party. This turnover weakens the power of the committees and thus their 
oversight ability as members can be replaced after they have gained expertise 
by a member with no expertise. 
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¾ The lack of requirement for a quorum.  The Knesset Parliamentary Procedures do not 
require a quorum for debates or votes, and determine that the committee chair has the 
power to continue committee meetings with any number of members present. The lack 
of requirement for a quorum impairs the decision-making ability of the committee and 
also damages their public image as committees may meet and vote with a small 
number of members present.  
 
¾ The lack of legal ability of committees to require ministers and officials to 
appear before them.  The Knesset committees have the power to request: (i) 
information regarding a government ministry’s activities, and (ii) that 
ministers and government officials to appear before them. However, the 
committees do not have the power (except for the State Control Committee) to 
compel appearances of the government officials or to enforce handing over a 
full set of information.  There are no sanctions to deal with non-appearance of 
officials or provision of only partial information.  
 
¾ The lack of binding status for committee conclusions.  The Knesset 
Parliamentary Procedures determine that motions for the agenda, which are 
passed to a committee, are returned to the Knesset with the committee’s 
conclusions. After a lengthy period of government disregard for the committee 
conclusions, two sections were incorporated in the Knesset Parliamentary 
Procedures (1977, 1985), which state that the Knesset Chair will transfer 
committee conclusions to the relevant minister, who then is obliged to respond 
within three months regarding actions taken in the light of the conclusions.  
However, it should be noted that committee conclusions are treated only as 
recommendations to the government and are not binding.  
 
¾ The public nature of committee meetings.  Knesset Parliamentary Procedures 
state that committee meetings are not open to the public unless the committee 
decides otherwise. Closed-door sessions may enable committees to conduct 
their business in more conducive atmosphere, which may lead to a compromise 
across party lines and provide more efficient oversight. Starting with the 
Seventh Knesset (1969-73) committees began opening some of their meetings 
to the media. Since then this trend has increased due to the general penetration 
of electronic media into the Knesset, and the desire of some Knesset members 
to appear publicly. This trend may weaken efficient oversight of committees 
(Hazan 2001). 
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Empirical Examination of Two Knesset Committees - Methodological Issues 
 
Research population 
 
The two Knesset permanent committees, whose oversight functions are examined, are the 
State Control Committee and the Education and Culture Committee. Committee functioning 
is defined for the purpose of this paper as a sequence, which is termed the “Efficiency 
Sequence” and appears as follows: 
 
Good functioning                                         Fair functioning                                        Poor functioning 
              |__________________________________|__________________________________|                
Efficient Oversight                                      Partially efficient oversight                      Inefficient oversight 
 
 
The functioning of the two committees is examined through a number of detailed parameters, 
which move along the “efficiency axis”, ranging from poor to good functioning. The research 
comprises qualitative content analysis from archival sources, committees’ protocols, and 
official and internal publications. 
 
Period of Time Examined 
 
The time period of the study covers three Knesset terms during the last three decades of the 
20th century, chosen in order to identify the development of trends in parliamentary oversight 
over time. The examined Knessets are: the Seventh Knesset (1969-1973), the Tenth Knesset 
(1981-84) and the Thirteenth Knesset (1992-96).  
 
Definitions of Parameters  
 
The functioning of both committees was examined by reviewing the following 
parameters: 
 
1. The first parameter differs for the two committees. For the State Control 
Committee the first parameter is “The deficiencies Raised by the State 
Comptroller”. The first parameter for the Education Committee is “Sources of 
Information Used by Committee”. 
 
2. Simultaneous Membership in a Number of Committees 
3. Participation of Committee Members in Meetings  
4. Professional Advisory Staff  
5.  Monitoring of Implementation of Committee’s Recommendation 
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Sampling 
 
A) The State Control Committee 
 
The State Control Committee scrutinizes the State Comptroller’s reports and submits its 
conclusions and proposals to the Knesset plenum, which debates and approves them. It should 
be noted that in the 7th Knesset, the State Control Committee was a subcommittee of the 
Finance Committee. 
 
Three Annual Reports of the State Comptroller that were published during the terms of the 
three Knessets were examined:  
 
1. Annual Report 23 for 1972 (7th Knesset),  
2. Annual Report 33 for 1982 (10th Knesset), and  
3. Annual Report 44 for 1993 (13th Knesset).  
 
Then the State Control Committee’s protocols dealing with the three Annual Reports 
mentioned above were surveyed. The debates which were chosen dealt with deficiencies 
raised by the State Comptroller in three main areas that consume more than one third of the 
annual budget: Education, Health and Interior Ministries (one debate in the 7th Knesset, 14 
debates in the 10th Knesset, and 14 debates in the 13th Knesset). Oversight activities of the 
State Control Committee and its efficiency are evaluated according to these protocols within 
the chosen parameters. 
 
B) The Education and Culture Committee 
 
The Education and Culture Committee deals with the following issues: education, culture, 
science, the arts, broadcasting, cinema, and sports. 
 
In the first two Knessets examined, a random sample of fifteen committee debates were 
chosen that were identified as having an “oversight” character (i.e. debates on government 
plans and activities of government ministries), and resulted in conclusions that were tabled in 
the Knesset. Oversight activity of the Education Committee and its efficiency are evaluated 
according to these discussion protocols, with analysis made according to the chosen 
parameters. In the 13th Knesset it was found that conclusions were drawn on only three issues 
that were not discussed within the plenum of the committee but rather in a subcommittee of 
the Education Committee. Therefore, no statistical evaluation of activity of the Education 
Committee in the 13 Knesset was possible. 
 
Empirical Evaluation of the Two Knesset Committees - Findings 
 
The extent of oversight effectiveness of the committees was examined through five 
parameters. 
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A) The State Control Committee 
 
1. Discussions in the Committee about the deficiencies raised by the State Comptroller 
regarding activities of the Education, Health and Interior Ministries:  
 
13th Knesset - committee                 10th Knesset - committee                    7th Knesset - committee 
debated most deficiencies                debated only a portion of                   debated only one deficiency                                                    
(95%)                                                the deficiencies (44%)                       (4%) during one debate 
               |_____________________________|______________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                      Fair functioning                                      Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                          (Partially efficient oversight)                  (Inefficient oversight) 
 
 
The findings indicate that the Committee’s oversight effectiveness on deficiencies raised by 
the State Comptroller increased over years.  The committee debated only one deficiency (4%) 
in the 7th Knesset while in the 13th Knesset it debated 95% of the deficiencies. However, the 
debate on large number of deficiencies raised by the State Comptroller does imply better 
functioning of the Committee in other parameters, which were examined. 
 
 
2. Simultaneous Membership in a Number of Committees: 
 
 
Number of members only    Number of members who   Number of members who 
on State Control Committee:    served on a second committee: served on at least two other  
committees: 
- 7th Knesset: 46%   7th Knesset: 39%   7th Knesset: 15% 
- 10th Knesset: 0    10th Knesset: 44%  10th Knesset: 56% 
- 13th Knesset: 1 member   13th Knesset: 47%  13th Knesset: 47% 
                     |________________________________|___________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                                   Fair functioning                            Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                                       (Partially efficient oversight)         (Inefficient oversight) 
 
Close to half of the committee members in both the 10th and in the 13th Knesset served on at 
least two other committees. 
 
 
3.  Participation of Committee Members in Meetings:  
 
In the 7th Knesset the average                 The average attendance of                  The average attendance in 
attendance in the debates  was                in the debates  in the 10th                    the debates in the 13th Knesset was                                  
62%. However, there was only              Knesset was 45%.There were              low at 25%. There were 14 debates  
one debate on deficiencies raised.          14 debates on deficiencies.                 on deficiencies. 
by the committee  
                      |________________________________|___________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                                   Fair functioning                           Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                                       (Partially efficient oversight)       (Inefficient oversight) 
 
The findings show that the average participation of members in the committee meetings 
decreased from 62% in the debates examined in the 7th Knesset (although, the committee 
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debated only one deficiency and thus arguably did not fulfill its oversight role) to 44% in the 
10th Knesset and 25% in the 13th Knesset. 
 
 
4.  Professional Advisory Staff 
 
Wide-ranging                                           A fair-sized                            In the three Knessets checked  
advisory staff -                                         advisory staff -                       there was a limited advisory  
not found                                                 not found                             staff at most in all debates                                                            
|___________________________________|_______________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                         Fair functioning                                   Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                              (Partially efficient oversight)              (Inefficient oversight) 
 
There was a limited number of professional advisory staff attending the debates checked and 
available to support the committee work.   
 
 
5. Monitoring of Implementation of the Committee’s Recommendations   
 
The committee carried                     The committee in the                    The committee did not monitor  
out continual monitoring -               13th Knesset carried out                implementation of its recommendations                                       
activity - not found                         limited monitoring activity          raised in three main areas in                                                           
                                                                                                               the 7th and the 10th Knessets                                   
                |_____________________________|______________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                         Fair functioning                                     Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                              (Partially efficient oversight)               (Inefficient oversight) 
 
When it comes to committee monitoring of implementation of its recommendations, there was 
a small improvement in the 13th Knesset in comparison to the two previous ones. However, it 
may be said that within this parameter, all three Knessets indicated overall poor functioning. 
In the 7th and the 10th Knessets the committee did not debate any follow-up steps, while in the 
13th Knesset it carried out only very limited monitoring activities.5.  Overall Findings  
 
 
6.  Overall Findings 
 
According to three parameters, there has been a deterioration in committee functioning. In 
addition, the last parameter on “Monitoring of Implementation of Committee’s 
Recommendations” shows poor committee functioning during all three Knessets. 
Simultaneous membership of the State Control Committee members in at least two other 
committees may have hindered the quality of the committee’s work and impaired its ability to 
apply proper oversight in the examined Knessets (particularly in the 10th and the 13th 
Knessets).  There may be a link between membership in multiple committees and the meager 
attendance of the committee meetings. Finally, even when a large number of deficiencies 
raised by the State Comptroller were debated, there was no monitoring of the implementation 
of the committee’s recommendations. If the committee’s recommendations were not 
implemented then the committee’s work may have been in vain. The data shows that the State 
Control Committee functioning (although improved in one of the parameters examined) was 
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mediocre, and deteriorated in several cases over time.  
 
 
B) The Education and Culture Committee 
 
1.  Sources of Information Used by Committee: 
 
Use of                                                 In two Knessets checked                            Dependence only on       
Independent                                        there was great dependence                        governmental sources - 
Sources only - not found                  on governmental sources                             not found 
                                                           (65% and 76%)                                             
             |_________________________________|________________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                             Fair functioning                                    Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                                  (Partially efficient oversight)               (Inefficient oversight)  
 
The committee functioning during the two periods was at best mediocre since the committee 
depended primarily on the government’s sources of information (76% in the 7th Knesset and 
65% in 10th Knesset). 
 
 
2.  Simultaneous Membership in a Number of Committees: 
 
Number of members only    Number of members who   Number of members who 
on Education and Culture Committee:   served on a second committee: served on at least two other  
committees: 
- 7th Knesset: 32%   7th Knesset: 63%   7th Knesset: 0 
- 10th Knesset: 46%   10th Knesset: 27%  10th Knesset: 27% 
- 13th Knesset: 0    13th Knesset: 38%  13th Knesset: 62% 
 
              |_______________________________|______________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                           Fair functioning                                 Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                                (Partially efficient oversight)            (Inefficient oversight) 
 
The findings indicate that in the second parameter, there was deterioration (particularly from 
the 10th Knesset to the 13th Knesset). In the 10th Knesset, almost half of the members served 
only on the Education and Culture Committee, while one third of the members participated in 
a second committee. In the 13th Knesset, no members served exclusively on Education and 
Culture committee, and almost two thirds of them served on at least two other committees.  
 
 
3. Participation of Members in Committee Meetings: 
 
 
Average attendance of                  In the 7th and 10th Knessets                   Average attendance of  
committee members in                   average attendance of committee          committee members in all 
debates was high (more                    members in 30 debates checked            debates was low (less than 
 than 50%) – not found                    was fair - 42% and 47% respectively    1/3) – not found 
                       |_____________________________|_______________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                                Fair functioning                                    Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                                     (Partially efficient oversight)               (Inefficient oversight) 
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In the third parameter in the two Knessets examined, functioning was mediocre. The average 
participation in committee meetings was 42% in the 7th Knesset and 47% in the 10th Knesset. 
 
 
4.  Professional advisory staff:  
     
A wide-ranging                                         A fair-sized                             In the two Knessets checked    
advisory staff -                                          advisory staff  -                       there was no advisory staff    
not found                                                  not found                                present during the debate except  
     for one legal advisor during one          
                                                                                                                        debate in the 10th Knesset                                      
           |__________________________________|_______________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                                    Fair functioning                                   Poor functioning 
 (Efficient oversight)                                       (Partially efficient oversight)               (Inefficient oversight) 
 
Research showed a lack of independent professional advisors, therefore the committee 
functioning is determined as poor. 
 
 
5.  Monitoring of Implementation of the Committees Conclusions: 
 
Follow-up debates regarding           Follow-up debates regarding              In the 7th and the 10th Knessets  
implementation of most of              implementation of some of                 the Education Committee did not 
the committee conclusions -           the committee conclusions -               carry out follow-up debates on 
not found                                       not found                           implementation of its conclusions                     
             |___________________________|____________________________| 
Good (full) functioning                   Fair functioning                                    Poor functioning 
(Efficient oversight)                        (Partially efficient oversight)               (Inefficient oversight) 
 
In the fifth parameter, the research shows that the committee did not carry out any follow-up 
debates on its conclusions which were tabled in the Knesset. 
 
 
6.  Overall Findings 
 
Many of the Education and Culture Committee members served on other committees during 
the three Knessets examined potentially diminishing the time spent on the Education and 
Culture Committee. This may be linked to the relatively low participation of committee 
members in the checked debates. In addition, the committee depended largely on government 
information, and lacked independent professional staff and advisors. Finally, the lack of 
follow-up debates on implementation of the committee’s recommendations demonstrates 
weak oversight. Lack of follow-up may mean that government does not feel pressure to 
implement the committee’s recommendations.  Overall the Education Committee’s 
functioning deteriorated in one of the parameters examined, and remained poor during the 7th 
and the 10th Knessets.  During the 13th Knesset there were almost no conclusions despite the 
large number of matters debated, showing weak oversight efficiency. 
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Conclusions 
 
Knesset committees suffer from structural deficiencies and a large number of procedures, 
which prevent them from carrying out efficient oversight of the Executive. The examination 
of the State Control Committee and the Education and Culture Committee shows that 
simultaneous membership on different committees has been increasing over the years. 
Previous research shows that this may lead to lowered attendance in the committee meetings, 
thus hindering oversight of the executive which requires time, expertise, and knowledge of the 
supervised areas. Committees can scrutinize draft laws from the government more efficiently 
and effectively than the plenary assembly through the benefits of specialization (Krehbiel 
1991). When a Knesset member serving on several committees must rush from one meeting to 
another (most committee meetings take place in the mornings of the three working days of the 
Knesset), that member may not have the time nor the ability to prepare for committee 
meetings and to develop expertise in the supervised areas, particularly as committees tend to 
oversee the activities of several ministries.  
 
How could Knesset committees functioning be improved? The following conclusions, 
supported by a study of Knesset committees carried out by Hazan (2001), show that partial 
solutions are possible. Since the number of Knesset members will not change in the 
foreseeable future, structural changes could alter the areas of authority of the committees in 
order to harmonize them with the areas of activities of central government ministries. At the 
same time, the number of members of each committee could be decreased. These steps would 
reduce some of the difficulties, particularly the problem of simultaneous membership in a 
large number of committees. Knesset members, who serve on fewer committees, will have 
more time to prepare, and strengthen their knowledge and expertise on the issues covered by 
the committee. Furthermore, committee members should cover only activities of one or two 
ministries in order to further narrow down the areas covered.  
 
In order to address procedural failures, political parties should be restricted from freely 
changing members of committees, and committees should be autonomous so that their 
members are not constantly threatened with removal when they expresses opposition to the 
position of their party. In addition, all committees (not only the State Control Committee) 
should have the authority to compel public servants and other citizens to appear before them 
and to submit full documentation. Having the power to compel individual cabinet ministers to 
attend a committee meeting and supply oral testimony places committees in a strong position 
to monitor ministries’ activities. Committees can use such hearings as an opportunity to 
question a minister on activities and policies, and to determine how the minister’s actions and 
attitude might differ from the politics of the coalition. Finally, committee meetings may 
benefit from being closed to the media and the public. 
 
Only an increase in committee budgets and removing them from the control of government 
will enable the committees to provide truly independent oversight, which should be enhanced 
by professional staff (including external experts and research institutes). Increasing the 
number of professional staff available to support the work of committees is crucial. Today 
each committee has one to two legal advisors on staff (the Finance Committee has also an 
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economist), however the committee chairs still complain that this insufficient to meet their 
needs. Furthermore, improving information sources for committees will improve their 
functioning. The first significant step to address this issue was taken by the Chair of the 15th 
Knesset. He initiated a reform that established an independent information and research center 
to supply Knesset members with objective and practical information through research, studies, 
and comprehensive background documents.  
 
The final area, where significant change is possible, is the ability of a committee to follow up 
on implementation of its recommendations. The committee, in general, must be capable of 
verifying government reactions to its conclusions and recommendations, whether they were 
taken in consideration or not.  Strong committees are not only able to monitor and amend 
proposed government legislation, they have the added ability to monitor and scrutinize the 
non-legislative actions of individual cabinet ministers. Therefore, committee conclusions 
should be granted a legal status, requiring ministers to report back to committee on their 
subsequent actions. Only then will the chain of oversight be complete.  
  
An improvement in the Knesset’s oversight function through its parliamentary committees is 
possible. If reforms are undertaken, they may help turn the Knesset committees into real 
watchdogs that can help to defend public interest, oversee government spending, and 
ultimately help to prevent corruption. 
 
 41
References 
 
Hazan, Reuven Y. 2001. Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
 
Krehbiel, Keith, 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of  
Michigan Press. 
 
Lees, John D., and Malcolm Shaw (eds.). 1979. Committees in Legislatures – A Comparative Analysis. 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. 1958. Considerations on Representative Government. Jerusalem: Hebrew University 
Press (in Hebrew). 
 
Pelizzo, Riccardo, and Rick Stapenhurst. 2004. “Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical 
Investigation.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388. Washington DC: WBI. 
 
State Comptroller Office. 1973. Annual Report no. 23. Jerusalem. (in Hebrew). 
 
State Comptroller Office. 1983. Annual Report no. 33. Jerusalem. (in Hebrew). 
 
State Comptroller Office. 1994. Annual Report no. 44. Jerusalem. (in Hebrew). 
 
State of Israel – Lawbook. Basic Law: The Knesset (1958). (in Hebrew). 
 
The Knesset. 2004. Rules of Procedure. Jerusalem. (in Hebrew). 
 
The 7th Knesset. 1969-1973. Education, Culture and Sports Committee - Protocols no. 12, 13, 51, 57, 
59, 72, 88, 109, 111, 115, 135, 139, 155, 170, 175. (in Hebrew). 
 
The 10th Knesset. 1981-1984. Education, Culture and Sports Committee- Protocols no. 3, 15, 16, 19, 
21, 22, 30, 33, 39, 55, 60, 68, 74, 103, 247. (in Hebrew). 
 
The 7th Knesset. 1969-1973. State Control Committee - Protocol no. 637. (in Hebrew). 
 
The 10th Knesset. 1981-1984. State Control Committee - Protocols no. 9, 22, 26, 126, 136, 137, 144, 
160, 179A, 181, 200, 205, 206,  210,  211. (in Hebrew). 
 
The 13th Knesset. 1992-1996. State Control Committee - Protocols no. 5, 202, 203, 216, 221, 230, 240, 
249, 280, 287, 308, 309, 317. (in Hebrew).     
 
 
 42
                                                
Parliamentary Oversight of Defense in South Africa 
 
Robert J. Griffiths 
 
 
Democratic Transformation and Defense Policy 
  
South Africa’s transformation from apartheid to majority rule represents a remarkable 
example of democratic transition and consolidation. The creation of perhaps the world’s most 
progressive constitution combined with the establishment and strengthening of institutions 
supportive of democracy have been important components of this success. Among the critical 
issues that have had to be addressed in the context of this transformation is the reorientation 
of defense policy and the establishment of civilian control of the armed forces. The issues 
surrounding security sector reform have been particularly important because of the role of the 
armed forces in repressing opposition to apartheid. South Africa’s role as regional hegemon 
and its role in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention further underline the 
importance of security sector reform.    
 
One of the key elements of the effort to insure transparency and accountability in the 
reorientation of defense policy is the establishment of parliamentary oversight of defense 
policy.   Because the security sector has responsibility for a critical state function, and because 
of the role of the military under apartheid, it is essential that parliament assure that the armed 
forces are under effective civilian control.  Beyond that, parliament can also serve as a 
counter-weight to executive dominance of defense policy.1  During apartheid there were 
theoretically mechanisms of civilian control, although in practice there was little oversight of 
the armed forces.  There were two reasons for this lack of supervision. First, national security 
played a paramount role during the “total strategy” era, giving the armed forces considerable 
influence in policy making.2  Second, while members of parliament had some military 
experience due to conscription, there was little effort to develop expertise in military affairs. 
Instead, the tendency was for parliament to accept the military’s assessments and 
recommendations.3  As one member of the parliamentary defense committee remarked in 
1996, before 1994 there were no civil-military relations to speak of, no strict oversight 
existed.4  Democracy’s requirements of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy 
necessitated the creation of institutions to ensure civilian dominance of defense policy and 
also opened civil-military relations and defense policy to greater parliamentary control. This 
involved the creation of a civilian defense department and secretariat, as well as establishing 
mechanisms for effective parliamentary oversight. The effectiveness of parliamentary 
 
1. See Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms, and Practices, Inter-
Parliamentary Union & Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003, p. 18. 
2. Total strategy was a policy formulated by the apartheid regime to combat what it saw as a total onslaught from 
communist and anti-apartheid forces. See for instance, R. Griffiths, “The South African Military: The Dilemmas 
of Expanded Influence in Decision-Making,” Journal of Asian and African Studies XXVI, 1-2 (1991); Kenneth 
Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986; and 
Steven Metz, Pretoria’s Total Strategy and Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Africa,” Comparative Strategy, 6. 
3.Interviews, Defense Headquarters, Pretoria, June 1992 and July 1996. 
4.Interview, Parliament, Cape Town February 2000. 
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oversight is influenced by a variety of institutional and practical considerations including the 
nature of the electoral system, patterns of party discipline, executive-legislative relations, and 
the capacity of the defense committees to effectively monitor policy.  
 
The Establishment of Parliamentary Defense Oversight  
 
South Africa’s electoral system uses a closed list, proportional representation method. 
Political parties compile regional and national lists for the 400 seats in the National Assembly 
(NA) and representation is awarded on the basis of the party’s proportion of the vote using the 
proportional, largest remainder method.5  Because the parties submit the lists of candidates 
and MPs do not represent specific districts, the party can impose strict discipline on its 
members and there is a high likelihood that MPs will support the party’s position on policy 
issues.6  Moreover, the executive has a substantial advantage in terms of expertise especially 
given the technicalities of defense policy. The technical expertise of the executive provides 
greater influence in formulating defense policy in contrast to the parliamentary committees 
which lack support staff.    
 
Reflecting the concern about civil-military relations and defense policy, two parliamentary 
committees were created to deal with defense after the 1994 elections, the Portfolio 
Committee (PC) and the Joint Standing Committee on Defense (JSCD). The Portfolio 
Committee focuses largely on legislation regarding defense. However, due to the changes 
required of the armed forces in South Africa, the Joint Standing Committee, composed of 
members of both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), was 
established primarily to oversee the military’s transformation.  
 
The allocation of seats on the PC is determined by the percentage of seats held in the 
parliament. The current distribution of seats on the portfolio committee breaks down in the 
following way: the ANC holds 10 seats, the Democratic Alliance (DA) holds two, the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP), Freedom Front Plus (FF+), and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) each 
have one seat. There are five alternates, three of whom are from the ANC while the other two 
representatives are from the IFP and the United Democratic Movement (UDM). On the JSCD, 
where representation is restricted to those parties with more than ten seats, the ANC holds 20 
seats, the DA has four, and the IFP has two. Of the four alternates, three are from the ANC 
and one from the DA.   
 
The committees have a range of powers that include the ability to summon witnesses before 
them, require them to give evidence or produce documents, require reports from individuals 
or institutions, and receive petitions, representations, or submissions from the public.7  Under 
the NA rules, the Portfolio Committee must maintain oversight of “the exercise within its 
 
5. For a detailed explanation of South Africa’s electoral system see “Election Resources on the Internet: The 
Republic of South Africa Electoral System,” by Manuel Alvarez-Rivera available at 
http://electionresources.org/za/system. 
6. See Lia Nijzink, “Opposition in the New South African Parliament,” Democratization, Vol. 8 Issue 1 (Spring 
2001), 56.  
7. See Parliament of South Africa, “The Work of Committees” available at www.parliament.gov.za. 
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portfolio of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation; any 
executive organ of State falling within its portfolio; any constitutional institution falling 
within its portfolio; any body or institution in respect of which oversight was assigned to it.”  
It may also “monitor, investigate, enquire into, and make recommendations concerning any 
such executive organ of state, constitutional institution, or other body or institution, including 
the legislative program, budget, rationalization, restructuring, functioning, organization, 
structure, staff and policies of such organ of the state, institution, or other body or 
institution.”8        
 
The JSCD has responsibility for investigation and for recommendations on the budget, 
functioning, organization, armaments, policy, morale, and the South African National Defense 
Force’s state of preparedness as well as any other functions related to parliamentary 
supervision of the forces as may be prescribed by law.9  The JSCD played an important role 
in reviewing the drafts and final version of the 1996 Defense White Paper and the 1998 
Defense Review.  Its membership has been drawn largely from the ranks of party bureaucrats 
and the committee has exercised considerable political clout.10  Because of the broad mandate 
outlined in the Defense White Paper of 1996, the JSCD has been involved in a variety of 
oversight activities. It has reviewed the budget, overseen policy implementation, tried to 
reconcile differences that emerged between the SANDF and the Defense Secretariat, and has 
engaged in fact-finding efforts such as after the September 1999 incident in which a black 
officer went on a rampage at an army base outside Blomfontein and killed seven whites 
before being shot dead.  The JSCD’s broad monitoring role was deemed necessary due to the 
challenges of integrating and transforming the South African armed forces.11 Although the 
transformation of the South African National Defense Force is not yet complete, the Portfolio 
Committee has taken on most of the responsibility for committee work related to the defense 
sector.12
 
Early tensions between the defense force and the parliamentary committees have given way to 
greater cooperation. Initial exchanges between the defense force and parliamentary 
committees were strained, especially between old guard SADF officers who were 
unaccustomed to scrutiny by parliament, particularly by a committee headed by ANC 
members of parliament.13  In fact, an initial request by the navy to purchase new vessels was 
rejected by parliament. This came as a surprise to military officers accustomed to getting what 
they wanted.14  During the development of the Defense White Paper and the Defense Review, 
as well as work on the Defense Act, the JSCD was actively involved and refused to rubber 
stamp decisions. Their involvement in drafting policy was initially resisted and viewed as 
 
8. National Assembly Rules, June 1999, Part 9, rule #201, p. 50.  
9.Defense White Paper, May 1996, Chap. 3, Section 2. 
10. Philip Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa’s Democratic Transition, (Boulder 
CO: Westview Press) 118-119. 
11.Interviews, Parliament, Cape Town, February 2000. 
12. Gavin Cawthra, “Security Governance in South Africa,” African Security Review, Vol. 14, No. 3(2005) 
available at www.iss.co.za/pubs. 
13.Interviews, Parliament, Cape Town July 1996 and February 2000. 
14.Interviews with Defense Committee staff, Cape Town July 1996. 
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interference but has now come to be accepted and even welcomed.15  Despite getting off to a 
somewhat rocky start, parliamentary oversight is now well-established and the committees 
regularly request meetings with defense officials and review policy and budgets.   
 
Certain key documents provide the basis for South Africa’s defense policy and represent 
guidelines for parliamentary oversight. South Africa’s shift to democracy prompted the 
Minister of Defense to present a draft White Paper on National Defense in June 1995, and to 
invite comments from parliament and the public.  Several subsequent drafts incorporated the 
comments of the various political parties, NGOs, the defense industry, defense analysts, the 
SANDF, the parliamentary committees, and the public.  The final draft, incorporating input 
from these participants was approved by the cabinet and released in May 1996.16  In 
presenting the White Paper, then Defense Minister Joe Modise described it as reflecting “a 
national consensus on defense policy.”17  The White Paper outlined policy on the challenges 
of transformation, civil-military relations, the strategic environment, budgetary issues, the role 
and function of the armed forces, the arms industry, and human resources issues.   
 
In an effort to elaborate on the broad policy outlines of the White Paper and in a further effort 
to involve the public, a Defense Review was undertaken in 1996.  Under the auspices of a 
working group appointed by the minister and coordinated by the defense secretary, national 
consultative conferences were held in February and August of 1996 and in May of 1997. Two 
rounds of regional workshops were also held throughout the country in July 1996 and May 
1997.18  The Defense Review sought to determine the appropriate size, structure, and force 
design of the SANDF into the 21st century and addressed issues such as South Africa’s 
approach to security and defense, arms control, defense posture and spending, peace 
operations and regional security, and deployment of the defense forces in support of the 
police.19  The review concluded that the SANDF should be primarily a defensive force under 
constitutional control and shaped by South African defense and national policy.  Its tasks were 
to defend against military threats and internal threats to the constitutional order, and to 
promote regional and international security. The SANDF was envisioned as consisting of a 
core force that could be expanded by calling up a part-time component when necessary.  The 
size and design of the force was to be based on a needs-driven but cost constrained approach 
to defense.  Initial indications were that defense allocations would be in the neighborhood of 
1.5% of GDP with recognition that circumstances might dictate fluctuation in that figure.20   
 
The Strategic Defense Procurement Package and Parliamentary Oversight 
 
The R50 billion Strategic Defense Procurement Package (SDPP) announced in 1998 provides 
an opportunity to examine South Africa’s progress in solidifying legitimacy, transparency, 
 
15.Thandi Modise, “Parliamentary Oversight of the South African Department of Defense: 1994-2003,” in 
Guarding the Guardians Parliamentary Oversight and Civil-Military Relations: The Challenges for SADC ed. 
By Len LeRoux, Martin Rupiya, and Naison Ngoma. Available at www.iss.co.za/pubs/books.  
16.”Drafting Memorandum,” Defense White Paper, May 1996. 
17.Forward, Defense White Paper, May 1996. 
18.See South African Defense Review, ch. 1, available at www.mil.za/secretariat/defense. 
19.See Defense Review, chap. 1. 
20.Defense Review, chap. 15, sections 13-20. 
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accountability, and parliamentary oversight of defense in light of the controversial decision to 
go forward with a large purchase of weapons from abroad.  
 
During apartheid, an international arms embargo prevented Pretoria from acquiring weapons 
abroad.  Although South Africa developed a sophisticated domestic arms industry it could not 
meet all the armed forces’ needs.  In 1998, after a 4-year debate, the government announced 
an R30 billion arms procurement deal to up-grade South Africa’s defense capability.  The 
purchases included three submarines, four corvettes, 30 helicopters, 28 jet fighters, and 24 
training aircraft.21  To pay for this package military spending was slated to increase from 
R10.72 billion in fiscal year 1999-2000 to R13.76 billion in 2000-2001 and then up to R15.27 
billion the following year.22  The R3 billion increase in the defense budget between the 1999-
2000 and the 2000-2001 budget was due to this procurement.23 Military spending was 
scheduled to rise to 16.8 billion in 2002/2003 with a further increase to 17.8 billion in 
2003/2004.24   
 
The decision to purchase these weapons and the increased military spending provoked 
considerable debate.  While the need to replace aging weapons was widely acknowledged, 
many questioned the expenditure of such a large sum.  Critics argued that it was extravagant 
in a country that was struggling to provide housing, electricity, and other social services while 
others charged that the procurement was ill-suited to South Africa’s likely defense 
challenges.25  Defense Department officials contended that instability in the region and the 
need to protect maritime resources justified the spending package.26  To make the purchase 
more palatable, a deal was negotiated that would purportedly bring some 65,000 jobs to South 
Africa’s economy which is desperately in need of employment opportunities.  The jobs would 
come as a result of an industrial offset package that requires suppliers of the weapons to 
invest in local industry.27  Despite government approval of the package, questions remained 
regarding the employment benefits of the deal and irregularities in the procurement process. 
 
The force design contained in the Defense Review was presented to parliament in March 
1998. While parliament endorsed the Review, it is not clear that parliament ever actually 
approved the arms package.  The Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA) asserted 
that when the parliament approved the force design, it did not approve the procurement 
package.  Instead, IDASA maintained that parliament approved a concept of defense that was 
likely to change over time, was subject to parliamentary oversight, and actually represented a 
 
21.Address by Minister of Defense Mosiuoa Lekota on the Occasion of the Defense Budget Vote, April 7, 2000, 
available at http://www.mil.za/ministry/speeches. 
22.See “Military Manoeuvres“ Africa Confidential 41, 8 (14 April 2000) 1. 
23.See “Business Report Budget Special,” Cape Times, 2/24/2000. 
24. “South African Military Budget” available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/budget.htm. 
25.See Rocklyn Williams, “How Primary is the Primary Function?: Configuring the SANDF for African 
Realities,” African Security Review Vol. 8, No. 6 available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR. 
26.See Tom Nevin, “South Africa: Guns and Butter,” African Business, January, 1999. 
27. See for instance, “Improper Influence in Arms Deal Probed,” Daily Mail and Guardian, October 31, 2000, 
available at http://www.mg.co.za. 
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wish list which the Defense Department realized was unrealistic given fiscal constraints.28  
Nevertheless, the government went forward with the deal, announcing in September 1999 that 
the suppliers had been selected and the price of the package was placed at R21.3 billion over 
eight years.29  The cost subsequently rose to R30.3 billion and by September 2000 was 
reported to be R43.8 billion due to foreign exchange rate changes and contractual price 
escalations.30  Estimates of the cost of the SDPP eventually rose to R53b by 2003.31    
 
Aside from the cost increases, questions were also raised regarding the benefits of the offsets 
guaranteed under the terms of the deal. These offsets required contractors to provide certain 
economic benefits to South Africa including selecting local subcontractors to provide some of 
the military hardware.  Contractors were also required to provide non-military trade and 
investment.  The value of these offsets was initially put at R110 billion but this was later 
reduced to R104 billion.32  These offsets were also supposed to create the 65,000 new jobs.33   
 
There were also allegations of corruption in the awarding of the contracts.  Then-Pan 
Africanist Congress MP Patricia de Lille produced documents she said came from ANC 
members alleging corruption including bribes paid to senior ANC officials and contracts for 
their relatives.34  Among those subsequently convicted of corruption were Tony Yengeni, 
then the ANC’s chief parliamentary whip and Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Defense during the contract negotiations, who obtained a discounted Mercedes from a 
contractor. He was convicted of fraud and sentenced to four years.  Other high ranking ANC 
officials accused of wrongdoing were the late former Defense Minister Joe Modise who 
signed an agreement for the purchase of submarines three days before leaving office. Modise 
subsequently obtained a loan to buy shares of a company, of which he served as chairman, 
that had interests in the arms industry.  Shamin Shaik, who was head of arms procurement for 
the Defense Department, was also alleged to have family connections to local firms that were 
awarded contracts as part of the offsets arrangement.35  Shaik’s brother, Durban businessman 
and one-time financial adviser to former deputy president Jacob Zuma, was also convicted of 
fraud and corruption. His conviction resulted in Zuma’s dismissal from his post as deputy 
president following Judge Hilary Squires’ characterization of the relationship between Shaik 
and Zuma as “generally corrupt.”36  The combination of skepticism about the cost and 
benefits of the package as well as the allegations of corruption ultimately triggered a series of 
investigations into the arms deal. 
 
 
28. “Democracy and the Arms Deal: An Interim Review by IDASA,” available at 
www.idasact.org.za/pims/arms/review. 
29. “Chronology of the Arms Deal/ Strategic Defense Procurement Package,” available at 
www.idasact.org.za/pims/arms/ebrahim.htm. 
30. “Fourteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts,” available at 
www.idasact.org.za/pims/arms/scopa.htm. 
31. “Arms Deal Cripples SANDF,” Mail and Guardian, 20 March 2003, accessed at www.mg.co.za. 
32. “Democracy and the Arms Deal,” www.idasact.org.za/pims/arms/review. 
33. Tom Nevin, “SA’s R50b Arms Deal Scandal,” African Business, June 2001. 
34. “Arms for Oblivion,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 42 No. 3, (9 February 2001) 7. 
35. “Lethal Weapons: South Africa’s Arms Deal Investigation May Uncover Corruption in the ANC, Time 
International, (16 April 2001) 44.  
36. “Zuma Axed,” The Star, 14 June 2005, available at www.iol.co.za. 
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In September 2000, the Auditor-General (A-G) who is constitutionally responsible for 
auditing all government expenditure submitted a report to the parliament’s Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).  SCOPA has responsibility for overseeing public 
expenditure of all government departments.  When SCOPA receives a report from the 
Auditor-General indicating any fiscal irregularity, the committee must investigate.  In the 
course of its investigation, SCOPA has the power to call the parties involved before the 
committee to account for and explain their actions.37  The A-G questioned why the approved 
package was significantly more expensive than other proposals and recommended a full 
investigation.38  SCOPA considered the A-G’s report and issued its own report in October 
2000 raising questions about the cost, offsets, the selection of both contractors and 
subcontractors and the Defense Department’s acquisition policies. It also called for a 
combined investigation involving the A-G, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), the Public 
Protector, the Investigating Directorate of Serious Economic Offenses, and any other relevant 
investigative bodies.39   
 
A meeting was held in November 2000 of several investigative bodies and it was determined 
that the Directorate of Special Operations of the National Prosecuting Authority, the offices of 
the A-G and the Public Prosecutor, and the Special Investigating Unit under the direction of 
Judge Willem Heath would conduct a joint investigation of the Strategic Defense 
Procurement Package.40  The South African Constitutional Court subsequently ruled that a 
judge could not head the SIU and Minister of Justice Penuel Maduna advised President Mbeki 
that the SIU under Heath should not play a role in the investigation.  President Mbeki then 
announced that he would not grant a special proclamation authorizing the SIU to take part in 
the investigation.41  The SIU, established by former president Nelson Mandela, had the 
capacity to invalidate contracts and reclaim state money if corruption was involved in the 
granting of contracts.42  The SIU reclaimed some R314 million between 1997 and early 2001 
from deals where it found evidence of corruption. Critics charged that the SIU was excluded 
because of its effectiveness.43 This issue became the subject of considerable controversy 
around whether SCOPA expressly called for the inclusion of the SIU in the investigation and 
President Mbeki’s decision not to allow the SIU permission to participate.44     
 
Acting on the recommendation of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, the Joint 
Investigative Team (JIT), consisting of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the Auditor-
General, and the Directorate of Special Operations of the National Prosecuting Authority held 
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its first meeting in November 2000.  Prior to its commencement, the JIT was referred to a 
total of six parliamentary committees.45  The joint investigation was unique because it 
involved the cooperation of three agencies conducting a simultaneous investigation into 
alleged irregularities and criminal conduct.  The public nature of the investigation was also 
unprecedented and as a result the JIT worked in uncharted territory.46  The JIT found that 
there were some irregularities and shortcomings in the procurement process.  There was a lack 
of evaluation criteria for companies submitting bids, business plans were not submitted in a 
timely fashion, and decisions on offset arrangements were made on an ad hoc basis.  The JIT 
also found that the Cabinet was aware of the cost escalation in the deal and investigators were 
critical of the model used by the Affordability Team. In addition, the JIT found that there had 
been a conflict of interest related to the involvement of the Defense Department’s Chief of 
Acquisitions, Shamin Shaik, whose brother had an interest in one of the foreign contractors.47  
 
The Implications for Defense Oversight  
 
The Strategic Defense Procurement Package provides insight into the development of 
transparency and accountability in defense policy and highlights the challenges of effective 
parliamentary oversight.  Arms procurement is particularly well-suited for analysis of 
transparency and accountability due to the controversy generated by arms sales, their 
technical complexity, and the potential for corruption often associated with such lucrative 
transactions. It also exemplifies several problems associated with parliamentary oversight 
including the role of party discipline, executive-legislative relations, and the capacity of 
parliamentary committees to adequately monitor the complexities of defense policy, 
particularly those related to arms procurement.   While the Defense White Paper and the 
Defense Review offered broad guidelines for defense policy, details were left out. The 
controversy over whether parliament directly approved the SDPP illustrates the ability of the 
executive to push forward with policies it favors even in the absence of explicit legislative 
approval. Once the executive decision was made, strong ANC party discipline made it 
difficult for MPs to challenge the SDPP.  Opposition parties could question the deal, and they 
did, but they were powerless to stop it. Moreover, a lack of both parliamentary expertise 
related to arms procurement and parliamentary support staff to assist MPs in making 
independent judgments regarding the purchase made it even less likely that parliament would 
challenge the decision. This reflects a key shortcoming of parliamentary committees in new 
democracies - the lack of defense expertise.48 Although members of the South African 
parliamentary committees often have military backgrounds, that does not guarantee the high 
level of expertise required to oversee the complexities of such an arms deal.   
 
Although the arms purchase was unique and such a decision is unlikely to come up again 
soon, the package demonstrates that the military retains significant influence in defense policy 
making despite the fiscal constraints and competition for resources in post-apartheid South 
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Africa.  The armed forces, prevented from purchasing arms from abroad during apartheid, 
lobbied successfully for a major upgrade in military hardware taking advantage of an open 
market and a post-Cold War excess of defense production capacity in the West.  The end of 
the international arms embargo and the decision to purchase arms from foreign suppliers 
required the creation of new procurement procedures. Parliamentary capacity, characterized 
by an unfamiliarity with the recently established procurement process and lack of technical 
knowledge needed to translate the approved force structure into appropriate weapons systems, 
combined with executive dominance of decision making and tight party discipline, hindered 
the ability of parliament to effectively moderate the armed forces’ push for an expensive 
weapons package. There was also confusion regarding whether the parliament’s approval of 
the Defense Review constituted approval of the arms purchase.  Gaps in the oversight 
capacity of the defense committees on this issue are also apparent. Among the general 
shortcomings regarding oversight mentioned by MPs are a lack of budgetary expertise, some 
unwillingness to challenge the defense department for fear of being labeled obstructionist or 
undermining democracy, and not developing an overall capacity to effectively oversee 
defense issues.49  In the latter case, legislative capacity-building has to be emphasized through 
the “development of analytical and policy-interrogative skills and defense parliamentarians’ 
understanding of the defense policy, planning, budgetary, and programming cycle.”50     
 
The arms deal also suggests some questions regarding the functions of independent 
investigative agencies, the separation of the ANC and the government and the role of 
parliamentary committees.  As the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) noted, in 
one-party dominant democracies, the strong party system and the close links which MPs have 
with the executive branch make it difficult to exercise effective oversight.51  The ANC’s 
dismissal of Andrew Feinstein, its head of the parliamentary study group on SCOPA and his 
replacement by Geoff Doidge, the ANC’s Deputy Chief Whip was seen as a reprisal for 
Feinstein’s backing of SIU involvement in the JIT.52  Feinstein later spoke at an IDASA 
seminar on parliamentary oversight and accountability and advocated close oversight of the 
executive and executive accountability to parliament.  He also called for SCOPA’s insulation 
from political interference, particularly from the executive.53  The February 2002 resignation 
of the Inspector General of Intelligence also raised questions of civil oversight, and in the 
aftermath of the SCOPA’s controversial push for an investigation of the arms deal, indicated a 
trend toward consolidation of executive power.  
 
Under President Mbeki parliamentary oversight has become less vigorous.  The president no 
longer faces weekly questions from parliament, and ministers appear before parliament less 
that they did under President Mandela.54  Nevertheless, parliamentary oversight has been 
firmly established even if not always fully realized. The Defense Portfolio Committee and the 
Joint Standing Committee on Defense are capable of reviewing legislation, holding hearings, 
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and monitoring defense policy. Also, since 1994, parliamentary rules give committees 
extensive powers, and most parliamentary committees conduct their meetings in public.55  
Furthermore, oversight ability is improving and the Portfolio Committee regularly amends 
bills seeking to leave its mark on legislation.56 Parliamentary influence on two other 
important pieces of legislation since the arms deal has yielded mixed results. The National 
Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002 was enacted despite concerns in parliament 
regarding issues of transparency and parliament’s participation in the review of conventional 
arms sales. In the case of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism Act 
of 2004, parliament played an important role in changing the provisions of the law defining 
terrorist activity.57   
 
In addition, the so-called Chapter 9 institutions, which are grouped in the constitution under 
the heading of “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy,” and include the 
Public Prosecutor and the Auditor-General are functioning and, in conjunction with the 
National Prosecuting Authority of the judicial branch, have played an important role in the 
investigation of the arms deal.  IDASA’s evaluation of the Joint Investigative Team’s report 
disagreed with critics who labeled the report a “white wash.”  IDASA concluded that the 
report was in some ways “quite damning.” It noted that the report was explicit about areas and 
departments in which controls were non-existent and checks and balances were ignored.58  
Furthermore, IDASA’s monitoring role and that of other organizations demonstrates an 
increasingly effective and vigilant civil society.   
 
The problems illustrated by the arms deal can be seen as the growing pains of a consolidating 
democracy.  The ANC’s dominant political position raises some concerns about transparency 
and accountability that will undoubtedly remain given the ANC’s capture of two-thirds of the 
vote in the 2004 elections and a commanding advantage of 279 of the 400 NA seats. 
Perceptions of the ANC’s intolerance of criticism and the centralization of power in the 
executive reinforce these concerns.59  Despite some flaws, the handling of the investigation 
and the public nature of the controversy over the SDPP demonstrates significant promise for 
the further strengthening of South African democracy and provides important lessons 
regarding defense oversight in South Africa.       
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